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The paper discusses tile cletermmau d Brazilian trade 
performance in the 1980s with an emphasis on the effects or 
macroeconomic instability, on imports policies and on lhe 
dinanm.ics or eiports and roriegn direct investment ln light or 
this, tbe paper discusses tbemes related to tbe rerorm oc 
commercial policies lo be advanced in the 1990s. 
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The aim or this study is lo discuss the causes ol observed structural 
dlaages in Bra!ilian trade in manufactures erperienced during lhe past 
decide. and address the emerging issues in the oagoing debate on the rerorm 
or lbe trade policy and trade-related industrial policy instruments in Brazil. 
The study is divided inlo two parts, besides I.bis introductiOIL 
Part one. dealing with past events. is basically desaiplive and 
aaalitically positive. The first two sections provide ractual bactgroung 
information.. Section 1. l very brieny desaibes the record ol trade 
performance in the eighties whose outstanding Ceatures were the 
reinrorcement or past trends IO'Wards import mmpression and Cast eiport 
growth and diveniricalioll. Seel.ion 1.2 shows bow the unstable 
macroeconomic environment inrtuenced the design ol measures shaping the 
lrade regime over the past decade. Nert the main determinants or the 
behavior or imports and erpor&s are sequentially discussed. rirst we describe 
tbe ewtution or the vast array or trade and industrial policy instruments 
wbic:h made up Brazil's restrictive structure ol import protection in the 
eighties (sec:tion l.3). Sea>o.d, we review the evidence stemming Crom the 
debate on the sources or Brazil's increasing mmpeliliveness in manuracwres 
{section VO. and the related debate on the role or foreign direct investment 
('Fl>l) in this process (section 1.5). 
Part two. on the other band, is essentially forward looting and 
analitically normative. Thererore. it begins in section 2.1 by squarelly 
addressing the issues emerging in the ongoing debate on the reform ol trade 
and industrial policies. As the reader will notice the main focus or criticism 
was not placed on the static allocative inefficiencies generated by the 
established policy regime. a point at Which most or orlhodo1 attack on 
import substitution (IS) policies was levelled'· In.stead, fol.loving the logic or 
the design or the Brazilian trade and industrial policy reforms, the main 
' By .. entensin list or aulhon starting by 'Bergsman (1970) ill lhe Bnlziliall case 
stully in the pioneeriag 1970 (It!) project on tnde policies in deftlopillg muntries. 
focus ol discontent bad to do with the handicaps the policy regime imposes 
to the attainment ol dynamic efficlency gains by surrling the competitlve 
environment facin& domestic producers. It then goes on IO desaJbe (sectlon 
2.2) the onsoins trade and industrial policy reforms launched by the Collor 
government. Section 2.3 addresses issues related IO the design or the reforms 
given the peculiarities ol the Bruilian trade regime, the maaoeconomic 
constraints and implications ol the reforms u rar as industrial targelJQa la 
concerned. In section 2.4 the prospects ol PDI and the debate on the reform 
ol the regulatory framework affecting PDI are di1CUssed. 
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bruitian total eiports, defined in quantum terms. grew 'S.51 annually 
between 1980 and 1989 with manufactured and semi-manuractured eiports 
growing somewhat raster - 9.'SI and 7.51 per year respectively. This ralher 
sound performance. vbose determinants will be diScussed iD great detail iD 
seclioo t.<l compares ravourably to that ol Lalin America, and even with 
world trade growth. allhougb it wu markedly iDrerior to Brazilian past 
performance - 17.91 acxomplisbed in 1966-80 - and also to llW of many 
Asian NlCs in lhe eighties. Imports, on the Olher band, declined signiricanUy 
ovec the 1980s. Total imports Cell by 2.31 annually. with the non-fuel groups 
eoolributing to the decline more heavily in lhe early part ol the decade. lo 
the later part. with the weakening ol oil prices and the advance ol domestic 
oil produc:tioo. non-Cuel imports recoveced tboU&h wilbout i.ncfeasiog overall 
imports. As a result of these iDrluences Brazil underwent an impressive 
trade balance adjustment. rrom a small surplus ol USS780 million and a 
curreDl account de(icit ol USS 16.3 billion in 1982 to a trade surplus ol US$ 
13.l billion and a stigbUy positive current aca>uDl surplus ol US$44 million 
in 198-4. 
Rovevec, there were important changes both in the importance or 
. international trade for Brazil's manu(acturiog sector as. well as in the 
a>mposilion of manufactured ei:portS Which reinrorced trends already 
perceived since the seventies•. On the one band, the long term mmpression 
of imports as a proportion ol total domestic consumption of manuractures, 
which accompanied Brazil's post-war industrialization and was oaty 
temporarily reversed between the mid-sillies . and the firsl oil sboct, 
proceeded to reach impressively low levels. As can be seen in Table t . 
. import penetration ratios fell to levels near setr surriciency. 
t Tor• •tait.d u.a,sis or Brazil's trade performance in th 1970-iCJS) period. see 
fri&sth &. Traaco (198111a). 
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Table I 
lm,ort penetntlon ud e11:,ort propensity n&lOI in aaauf11CtUriD1.1980-l919 
1!8.0 1211 l!&Z 1213 l~ l!&:I 1!&6 l!&Z 1211 1!&2 
doll1r1 
(I) Output 176.6 114.7 l99J 138.7 J.(9.6 171.5 l9U ZOU 2302 HU 
(2)bports 17.1 l9J 17.0 19.0 23.9 22.1 19.6 23.l 30.l 35.6 
(3) Imports 12.4 IOJ IJ 6J 62 6J 9J 9.9 102 l:SJ 
bport propen1itiu • (Z) I (I) <U 
9.69 10.7 1.51 13.7 16.o 12.9 10.1 11.1 13.l IZ.O 
Japort penetnr.ion • (3)/1(1)-(2)•(3)) (~) 
Z.20 :l!I ~.:I! HZ· ~.Zl 4.J.C H! 4.19 4M :122. 
Source: CAm ud ll!GE. 'le t.hant Leda Banh ror her tind helJI in processing I.he 
rwdlla. 
On the other band, manufactured e1PQl'1$ grew as a proportion oC total 
demand oC domestic manufacturing, and diversified towards higher value 
added products. The increased "tradeability" oC Brazilian manufacturing can 
be dearly seen by the rising export propensities shown in Table 1. though 
· the shrinkage oC manufactured imports conveys the opposite impression, 
thus reinforc:Jng the ambiguities usually round as regards the proper 
charac:terization oC outward orientation•. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed 
that BrWI at the eod oC the eighties is, according to a recent World Bank 
report, ·relatively underinvolved ,in the international division oC labourM2, an 
impression shared by a recent. and widely distributed document or the 
influential The Federation oC Industries oC the State oC Slo Paulo - FIP.SPS. 
The cbanaes iD the composition oC manufactured exports can be seen 
in Table 2, where e1porU are dassified according to the presumed source oC 
competitiveness following a methodology developed in OF.CD ( 1987). The 
classification into the five groups in the table is somewhat arbitrary, but 
certainly informative. Tatite Z shows the cbaoa·ina comPoSitlon oC exports 
towards manufactured products and, and within ~ away from resource 
based industries and towards ecale intensive (heavy industry) and the bigb-
tecb groups. The most significant gain vas in the heavy industry groups 
I For u eitendecl discussion or sucb aabiguW.euee Belleiner (1991). 
2 The Yorld But 0989. p. 6). 
S FIESP <1990, pp. '°9'6). 
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where obemioate, papol" and pulp, pla•taoe, •tool -d trau~ mat.rial 
(e1cluding aerospace) have all e1perienced very significant increase_t in lbeir 
shares oC manufactured exports. The continuation oC the export upgrade 
initiated in the late sillies is clearly perceived, though it is interesting to 
note that the proCile or Brazilian manufactured eiporu is rather similar 10 · 
the one d ·non-core· OF.CD countries - the OECD" aroup in the table - i. e. Ule 
Scandinavian countries plus Australia, Belgium and The Netherlands. 
TlbleZ 
Com.,posltioa oCBnzillaA Elports.1970-1911. ,,,...,_, 
1!11' 1m-21 l!&Hl l!IZ:U 
1r1111 omE omr 
• utural resource bued "·" 43 . .C 36.1 13.5 3U ZU • labor in&euive 9.1 15.7 14.6 u u 13.6 
•scale intensive (beavy indutery) 9.1 z.c..a 33.0 5U 41.2 39.I 
• dirf'enntialed products 5.6 12 . .C 10.5 27.3 7.9 11.5 
• scieDce based 3.9 5..5 15.5 4.4 u 
Memo: P!l!!factwlnc • I d l!!lal 38.0 :ff .O 57.0 7Q 0 
' llblrw f• 1970 .,. DOt 1trlcUy -pll"lllle. In Ille ·1111ura1 fllOUl'Ce ...... ll'OUP only tbe food 
industry (ISIC 51) I• -ldered. Within "labor lntemne• only ISIC IJ'GUPI 32 IDd 53 (&extll•. 
1p1rel. nod IDd furniture). In "bellty IDd111try 0 ll"OllPI ISIC 34-57 are auembled. IDd tbe 1bare for 
dllwentllled prodacta" encmapaua all ISIC 38 illdllltrla. For Iller Pl!f'iod• die cla11ficatlon 11 
•liptly different. incluclinc more llruxbel In reaarce lllled IDdustrl• haten from tbe ICIJe 
intmlhe lfOUP) llld In labor illt8mi19. ISIC pwp 58 II d!Ylded lnro dirlf1llllllud IDd science 
baed lfllUPS. For 1914-85 founb lllld fifth cohlllDI llMw allarel d O<DE llld "DOii-care O<DE. 
...,.ted a OCl>E •,a lllWP em.posed lly Amtnlla. Belgium, Flnlud, Tiie Nedlerl1Dd1, N-.y IDd 
Sndeo. 
S---: Frl\ldl 6. Fnnco ll989a. p, 44) IDd CNI (1989). 
The forces underlying these cb&Dges are manifold. On the whole, 
however, they result from a combination oC two broad set or causes. The first. 
are the stimuli given to producers c:l tradable goods by m&a'oeconomic 
policiea aimed at eiternal· adjuatment from &he beginning or the balance or 
paymenu difficulties which culminated into the debt crisis. Sharp 
devaluations and cyclical contractions or domestic demand are among 
mla'OCOllOmic influences in trade performance discussed at length in section 
vu. Besides, a fundamental determinant or the behavior or imporU was the 
further tightening or already biahly repressive import policies regulated by 
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a van array at lr•d• and lndu11rW policy in1trum•nt1 rollowl.na tho Noond 
oil 1boct. Likewise, as far as export behavior ls concerned, an imporUnt 
fac:tor was certainly the maintenance ol a battery ot e1port incentives built 
from the second batr ot the the sillies, while explain nuctuations around the 
growth trend. Sec:tion lJ reviews the cbanaes undergone In the trade regime 
through the 1980s. 
The seeond set ot causes - especially imporUnt in explaining long term 
trends in the growth and composition ol e1ports - is the host oC structural 
factors underlying the patterns oC competitiveness in Brllilian 
manuracturing since the late sillies. These fac:tcrs range from dynamic 
economies generated during the process or industrial maturation to 
exogenous influences shaping the integration ot the most dynamic Industrial 
firms with global industry, a process to which local affiliates ot MNCs have 
played an imporUnt role. This is the object ot sections 1.4.2 and 1.5. It ls 
now apt to give the reader a bird-eye's view or the evolution or the unsuble 
mac:roecoftOmic environment lo vblcb these traftlformaUons toot place. 
l.Z) Tile •utale IUCl'Mceaeaic eaTinaaeat 
Macroeconomic instability bas been an outstanding feature cl 1980s 
not only in Brllil but in Latin America more generally. Growth performance 
bas been dismal in Latin America- annual rates ot 1.11 for 1980-89 and per 
capita income falling by 0.71 yearly. Brllil bas done much better, 
maintaining income per capiU more or Jess consunt through the eighties, 
but her performance contrasts quite unCavourably with that oC past decades 
- 9.61 per year in 1966-80. High inflation was also a distinguished feature of 
the 1980s in Latin America, and Brllil is among the five cases or 
hyperinflation registered in the late 1980s1/there being, therefore, as many 
such cases in Latin America as in Central Europe in the troubled 1920s. 
I That also include Bolivia. P9ru, Argenlilla. and Nlcarqua. In fact, considering the 
monthly llV9np rue or the list sis months or the thirteen bovn hyperi.11.flaUon 
can, Bniil's early nineties' ntn clusifaes u the 7th worst byperi.11.11a&ion ill bislory. a. Franco (1990&). 
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Th• oriainl ol maer0900DC>mic imtability in Latin America, and 
certainly in Brull, are connected, lite r.entral Europe in the 19201, to 1 
perverse combination or ·outstandina economic c:hallenae• posed by eiternal 
shocks and increased indebtedness with the governments' loss or decision 
capacity on economic issues. It is intereslinl to note, regarding the Bruilian 
experience, that while the external transfer - i e .• the generation or trade 
surpluses in the mqnitude needed to accomodate debt payments - was 
mosUy accomplished in the early eighties thanks to real devaluations and 
recessions. the same cannot be said with respect to the internal transfer - i 
e. , the fiscal burden or debt transfers. wblch was substantially ina'eased 
through the 1980s as governments assumed the responsibility .ror debt 
servicing - which implied a marked deterioration or fiscal accounts. The lack 
or resolution or the internal transfer withi.o the realm or the public budae.t. 
that is, the incapacity to find a domestic distribution ot the burdem through 
-the t11 system. is key to the fiscal aisis that Brui.1 e1perienced durina the 
Sarney presidency (1985-1990). 
Bratilian maaoeconomic perf ormanc:e in the 1980s bad indeed two 
distinct moments: up to the second semester d 198-t, macroeconomic, as well 
IS trade and industrial policies. were heavily innuenced by the process or 
nteraal adjustment to commutative impact d the second oil shoct, the 
explosive ina-ease in dollar interest rates and the collapse or commodity 
prices whose costs were exacerbated by the sudden dryina up or financial 
flows Crom foreign banks Crom 1982. Mtenrards. with the end or the 
military cycle, locally developed 'fucal imbalances emerged with a growing 
severity durina the Sarney ad ministration, in connection with the domestic 
maaoeconomic disequllibria stem.min& Crom diffaculties in solving the 
.. ...Uc transfer problem, and slowly b~me the tey maaoeconomic issue 
as the 1980s wore out. 
The economy's impressive external adjustment record after 1982 -
which comprised the rapid transformation ot a deficit in trade in goods and 
non-factor services or nerfy 8 I ot GDP in 1982 into a small surplus in 1984 
- involved a combination d measures such as devaluations with expenditure 
reducing measures, as well as very aaressive export promotion policies and 
restrictions to imports, as shown in detail in the nen section. As the e:rpc)rt 
led recovery set forth ID the second semester or 1984, seemed not to 
endanger the trade surplus, attention shifted to domestic mnstraints to 
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erowdt. On Ibo ono bond, tho o•pondituro -itohlne mooeuro• had lho otroot 
ot sharply raising i.nClation, and on the other, it was dear then that as long as 
net foreign capital inflow• remained depressed in relation lo pre-aisis levels 
the recovery ot domestic investment would have to be financed through an 
inaease in national savings, whose share in output bad Callen continuously 
since the beginning ot the decade, a fact that could be almost entirely 
attributed to a sharp ran in aovernment savinas. 
Yet, during the Sarney'1 years, there was a continuous deterioration ot 
the fiscal accounts. The first impact came Crom the erosion ot government 
revenues wbic:b Cell Crom 2'4.71 ot GDP in 1980-1983 to 19.91 in 1988, 
mosUy by virtue ot ta1 erpenditures and raulty indexation ot ta1 revenues 
(the Oliveira-Tami ettect). Since the costs ot both domestic and enernal debt 
bad their importance reduced through the Sarney years•, and public 
investment bas suffered a slight decline, the generation ot a fiscal deficit 
(operational ooncept) estimated at about 9.11 ot GDP at the begl.nn.lDg ol llle 
CoUor administration seems to derive from increases in current eipenditure. 
These developments stem Crom the undeveloped state ot flSCll and 
monetary institutions in Brazil. which are not designed to enhance discipllne 
especially in a reaime ot open political competition ror public money, a 
weakness magnified during Sarney's term by virtue ot his fragile political 
basis and authority. Yet. parallel to the uncontrolled multiplication or current 
and tar expenditures during these years, one observes a marted 
deterioration ol the go~ernment's regulatory capabilities in trade and 
industrial policies. renecti.ng the granting ot public benefits - fiscal and 
regulatory - much beyond the public sector's rmancial and administrative 
capacity. Fiscal disarray, and its most dramatic expression - hyperi.nClation -
precluded the recuperation of the level oC gross filed capital formation rrom 
the depressed levels or the early 1980s deteriorating tong run growth 
prospects ol the Br8li.1.ian economy 
The hyperinflation. ol l 989-90 represents indeed an important 
discontinuity in Brullian economic nee. a mijor economic dislocation causing 
prolund changes in economic modes ol behavior and institutions. Brazil is 
I 'Mosdy by Ille underindeliJl.g or Ille domestic debt. wh0te 1ervice claimed oaly OJt. or 
GDP in 1987. In 1989 i1 may have reached l'I. 1mn Ille special ci.tcumscaaces or di.at 
J9U'. laterest paymenll on Ille public ellenlal debt were reduced rrom Ht. or GDP in 
19'4 lo l.6t. in 1989. 
,.,. 13 
en&erina the l 9901 wiib • full ••nd• ol ... rorme, wb.iob inolude • &.borou9b 
redefinition ol lbe public sector's role in lbe economy, indudiq the design d 
institutions capable ol enforcing fiscal and monetary discipline, a sweepi.Dg 
deregulation ol trade and industrial policies and lbe privatiz.ation ol public 
enterprises and services. Tb.ese reforms should be seen aa essential 
preconditioo.s for inflation stabilization. wi1bout which growth ressumption 
on the basis ol a recovery ol private lnvestmenl Is not lltely to obtain. 
However, even it Brazil happens to overcome the dilTicultie1 in the 
design and implementation ol stabilization policies, and contidence . and 
investment are restored, there remains the equally dramatic problem ol 
sustaining long term growtb.. This process sb.ould involve the reversal ol the 
recent erosion in public sector saviqs, which along with an adequate 
international economic environment, an adequate b.andlin& ot debt 
rescheduling process and outward looting policies to avoid foreign e1ebange 
shortages. are the essential pre-conditions for restoring Brazil's bigb. 
historical growth rates in the future. The situation is further a>mplicated, 
however, by the fact that, although the "Brazilian Moder delivered an 
e1traordinarily b.jgb. economic performance, standards ot livin& and social 
indicators are still appallin&ly low. a fact which ls viVidly perceived now by 
a large spectrum ol politically represented opinion as d.isrunctional for the 
process ol democratic institutional building tb.e a>untry i.s engaged since tb.e 
end of the military regime in 1985. ChangiDg tb.e present e1treme rates ol 
inequality will require long-term distributive policies and an inaease in the 
supply of basic social services which. if not properly backed by a recovery d 
savings. may prove incompatible with the imperative ot restoring the 
investment ratio to trend levels. The political feasibility ot a sustained 
recovery will therefore. depend on political decisions regarding the classical 
trade-ocr between growth and distribution. 
l.J. Tia• •nl•U.a .r lll• n1•la&8ry r ......... rk: ....... ".,, 
This section desaibes the evolution ol Brazilian trade and industrial 
policy framework over the past decade. It is argued lb.at parallel to the 
inaeased stringency of tb.e trade regime, its decentralization, inaeasiogly 
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dillcretlona,.Y charact.er 11nd iu ompluaeia oo os-pt.iooe luavo produood • 
l)'mbiosis between trade and industrial policy that results in turning trade 
reform much more or a far reaching change with respect to past practices 
tban one could 1 prit:¥i npecl. 
l.3.1) The trade regime 
Since the reforms or the mid-sixties, which corrected the most glaring 
distortions or the incentive structure or the heyday or the IS period, the 
Brazilian trade regime displayed three basic features. r.ll'Sl, despite tariff 
cuts implemented in the late 60s a still very restrictive import regime based 
on disa'etionary import licensing, which was used as a partial but a-ucial 
element or industrial policies; seoond, very active export incentive schemes 
including subsidies and import duty eiemptions; last, but not least, a fairly 
well managed aawting peg which avoided, except ror very brier episodes, 
tbe damaging erchange rate appreciations typical ot the early post-war 
years. 
When looted at in a long run perspective. the genesis ot these 
distinguishing reatures or the Brazilian post-war trade regime can be said to 
have been largely conditioned by oonstraints and opportunities opened by 
developments in the world eoonomy. Indeed, the basic characteristics oC the 
import regime can be traced to the early post-war external shocks affecting 
the balance oC payments position when, as in many other developing 
countries, policy makers revealed a preference for quantitative restrictions 
(QRs) and multiple exchange rates over tariffs and real devaluations. During 
the sixties, however, the increasing awareness or the importance ot exploring 
the possibilities open by a fast expanding volume oC world trade in 
manufactures made for a move towards a more balanced structure or 
incentives. This change was mostly based on the introduction or export 
promotion schemes, exchange rate unification and the adoption cl a aawling 
peg and, to a lesser extent, to import liberalilation comprising the rela11.Dg or 
QRs and further tariff cuts. 
The move towards greater import liberalitation., cautiously begun in 
the mid-sixties, was cut short by the Cirsl oil shock, which restored the 
traditional balance ol payments rationale ror the maintenance oC generalil.ed 
QRs. In addition to tariff surcharges raising the minimum tariff to over 1001, 
••••ure• ol N•lrio&.ioa lnoluded ao iA&eN•'-r ..... 1&0-day_ advalM» ct.poelu 
(at a time in wbicb lnllation wu run.niog at 301 annually) tor impor&ers, tbe 
crealion ol 1 list ot banned imports and lhe reaistralioll ot impor&er1 wiUl 
CACEX (the import licensiog aulborily) and u iacreuiog use ot local coo&ent 
provisions entorced by CACEX and by a bost ot other 1overnmen1 qencie1 
sucb u developmenl banks, 1ta&e en&erprise1, and regula&ary bodie•. 
Tbil time, bovever, COIW'ary IO lhe early post-war years, lhe coocern 
with m.anutactured eiport performance wu reintorced by tbe Uareat ot 1 
binding foreign e1cbaoge COD1trainL In tact. allhougb tbe initial re1pome IO 
the 197-4 aboct was naturally defensive, leading to lbe ligh&eaiog ot 
administered import restraiotl, lbe 1U.lained recovery ot world trade in 
manufactures and tbe need to ina'ease foreign eicbance earnings gave a 
renewed impetus to more outward orienled policies, almost eiclusively 
based on enhanced e1port inceDllvet. 
The sea>nd oil shoct came when. by virtue ct e1terna1 and ill&ernal 
polilical j>ressures. eiport subsimes and tbe advance deposit on imports 
were about IO be phased out, and l.bese movements were reversed. J.n 
addition, in 1979 a .111.r.ridevaluation marted tbe firs\ sipil'.icant departure 
from I.be crawlina Pea regime siDce its inceplion in 1968. Jn I.be neit year 
two new instruments were created: I.be JOF ( f111po.f'IO sobre t.p."'*"' 
~.aw on rmaaeiaJ operations) wi1.b a n&e ot I 51 was applied to 
impons and I.be Cenlral Baiit established a mUainum maturity requirement 
for e1ierna1 finllDCi.Da for imports wJl.bout foreian eicbaaae CXJVer•. J.n J 98 J. 
thanks co previous errmu or imPon,ers· regislration. CACEX Slatted to 
require lbe submission of an annual import proaram on . \be part of all 
registered impor\ers. Thus, af\ef I.be aecxmd oiJ sboct, the multiplicity of 
i.Dslrume.nts ot adaiinistratJve control ewer tbe import process aiVe.n to 
CACEX considerably increased its discretionary powers: it actually bad 
powers to suspend discrelionarily tbe issuance of imports licenses tor all 
impons2. 
Anotbet important cbaoge in lhe nature ot ~trumenu ot Braz:ilian 
import policy during the 1970s and early 19101 was tbe marted 
I &cludiDI dlote effected as part of foreqn ila't"etl.tlleats into Bnzil. 
2 &cepl &hose under 01pecial re1iaes" •ch u dta•-Mct anqeaeats aad LAIA 
qreemeots, iapor1S for &he Mauus Free Zooe &Ad pnrn.menl purchaet, for 
eu.,a.. A more clecailecl discuaion or "apeciar import relima is aacle belo•. 
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cl'-r•lllDa"- and dMentf'~Uoa cl admUU.e...1.i- •• ._... lo lmport.. 
The aeveral . instruments mentioned above, in additlon to many sedor 
1pec:ir1e restrictions. were iuperimposed on these administered by CACEX 
and managed often on an unmordinated fashion by dilTerent government 
agencies following sometimes conrticUnt criteria. Foreign eichange rationing, 
evidenUy, pervased the actions cf all, but industrial policy conceptions 
aoveroJng the use cf this wide array cf discretionary instruments very cften 
CIOllflic:led, u it will be discussed below. 
The striqency with which CACEX etercised its import control powers 
varied markedly with the balancie cf payments position, being very dilT'acult 
to capture it quantltatively, particularly· in view cf the difficulties to 
evaluate the e1tent cf bureaucratic harassment However, it is reasonably 
accurate to say that. although some rela11t1on could be observed on import 
reatric:Uou over the put few years, until 1990, when the current 
liberalization eiperiment IO be described in Part Two began, the coverage ol 
QRs, u already mentioned, remained at 1001. The stringency was certainly 
ina'eased in 1982 when negative lists and f manciag requiremeats. were 
a>asiderably tigb1ened, but in 1984, wbeD the balance ol payments position 
e1hlblted a marted improvement. these same restrictions were rela1ed. In 
addition, import programs required by CACEX were deemed only ·indicative· 
and tariff sUrcbaf'les in effect since 1976 - in the range ol 301 to 1001 -
were replaced by inaeased tariff rates, with additions in the range ol l 01 IO 
30S. , 
• An important consequence Or the operation cf these administrative 
import controls was to make the relatively high Brazilian tarifl's a secondary 
line cf defense within the Brazilian protectionist system. Qmsumer goods 
were compressed by the tow priority conrerred to them in the issue or 
import licenses, or faced outright prohibition, while intermediate and capital 
aoods had to jump the tough additional barrier oC the so-called 9taw or 
aimilars·. ACCXX"diq to thta unwritten law any imported product should be 
subject to an e1am to assess the eitent IO wbicb. o,ne could rand ·s1muar· 
national products. Ir this can be proven in ·similarity eiams· carried out by 
a CACEi eipert chosen in c:onjuction with the business associations involved, 
U..n U.. illlport la forbiclenl. Tbe "law ol •i•ilaH• i9 • cruoial by-product ol 
the discretionary powers granted to CACEX. and one that turned out to 
become a aucial domestic mark.et sharing device. The threat to use to 
procedure was often used 1.0 enforce scbemes d import ceiling 
( t:00~UJe11ttJ with domestic producers and, when large scale projec:ls 
were under consideration, CACEX managed to negociate with impoc1ers and 
busJness assodalions 1.be so called ·participation agreements·. 1.brou&h whicb 
a ·.local content• level was agreed Cot 1.be whole project. Very dearly, this is 
an important instance ol symbiosis between trade and industrial policy. 
By geoeratiog an import structure buic:ally formed by non-
competitive goods, this system aeated an important distributJve distortJon: 
importing firms inv1riably applied Cot tariff eiemplions or reduetions under 
·special import regimes· Cot priority imports, which were aranted by specific 
JegisJalions, or on ID .td-Awlc'buis by 1.be Tariff Commisaon (a>A) as a fiscal 
.inceolive witbout fldna opposition from domestic suppliers. As a result. 
nearly 671 ol Brazilian imports entered tbe country in 1985 with tariff 
reduc:Uons or eiemplions, as shown in Table 3. 
Tbe nature ol 1.be ·special regimes· is quite varied. It comprised '42 
different types in 1989, the table showing only 1.be most important ones. 
Quite dearly lbe two most important regimes, to judge from the value ol 
imports involved, are related to e1port p~omotion scbemes (aroup JI) 1111d 
supply·amootbina foodst.uffs import (group IV) which together respond for 
nearly '41 I ot all imports in 1985~ Among the former. besides 1.be traditional 
draw-back scbemes, we find the BEFIEX program, ID important scbeme 
wilbin which firms accept e1port commitments in e1change Cot gaining 
aaiess to imported intermediate inputs and capital goods at international 
prices, as described in more detail in section VU below. Tbe imponance ol 
this program can be gauged by 1.be fact that nearly 501 ol manufactured 
e1ports were made under ,the program by ~ late 1980s, as shown in Table 
6 in sec1ion J.'f.J below. 
I So..U..S, Yheo a liailu product is not a&Aufactured. Ille au&horW. aay ·iAvile" 
IWioaal f"U'm.s co prneot a pro&otyge or Ille product ullder coAlidon&Joa. u Ille 
prototype is deemed acceptable Ille i.aport is rortiideo. la &he specific cue of the 
ialor..Ucs la•, co be counted iA de&ai.1 below. olleo not even a pror.otype YU 
aecessary besides the iAte~A of a.ati.oul f°ll'ms to maaufacture the potealW iaport. 
Ta!tle3 
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V. Gcrvenuaenl ud SlaU Entuprises Z70.0 3.7 
VI. AirTrulpol'Cal.ioa 324.0 4 . .C 
VII. Broadcast&Mavie IDduSlr'J 2'.6 0.3 
TIU. MylOS free 7.ooe (lf)() 437.1 l9 
Iol!J 4.926.5 66.7 
1 S11mnt ill 1111a1 1_,.,.. arladl .. ell. Sauree: r- ( 19&1, TUle 3.3). 
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Amona the other types d ·specia.I regimes·, wbicb encompass nearly a 
quarter d au non-oil imports, we may find a number d import regimes 
administered by sectoraJ (groups VJ and VII, and Ule shipbuilding industry 
imports in lfOUP JJJ) or regional agencies (SUDAM, SUDENE. and Ule Manaos 
free Zeme), aovernment bodJes (group V) and councils administering olller 
industrial policy instruments (<DI and ·others· in group III). Jo each speciaJ 
regime 1.he eiempt.ions d restric:live provisions on importing is varied. Jn 
\be BHFIBX cue, Ule crucial eiemptioft, besides tariff reductions, is from Ule 
1aw d similm·, although decisions are still i:nf'ormally subject to approval 
by the relevant business associations. Jo draw-bade operations and in 
pursbues from LAJA couoUies, import Pf08f&ms, external financing 
requirements and negative lists were aJso waived. For Ule Manaos Free Zone 
imports 1.he same e1emptions apply, eicept for Ule eiteroal financing 
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requirement ud the annual toreian esc:banae quot. tor th• resion. In moat 
eases. the import authorization is used as a aucial mecbarusm for project 
approval and negotiation ot capacity lDa'eases. import CX>Otent and other 
regulatory features ot spedric industrial activities. 
Another interesting consequence ot the proliferation ot ·special 
regimes· for im&)orts in force in the 1980s in Brazil vu the large difference 
between legal tarifrs and the ones etrectlvely prtCl.iced.1. e .. the "ltue· levels, 
meaning the revenues ot import ta1es u percentage ot lbe value ot .imports. 
shown in Table '4. Note that the a>mparisoll is even more striking regarding 
etrective rates ot proteCtion iC ve comider lb.at tbe latter is undesUmated 
given the overwhelming presence ot QR.s. tr etrec:tive rates ot protection 
were mmputied on the basis ot ·equivalent• tariffs, instead ot using legal 
tariff a. its numbers would be much larger. 
Tlllle4 
8nzil: lepl aad ·1n1e· rares or proledion. llJS.C 
loaiul mectm 
Seqoc Ltg.1 Trot J.epl Tcue · 
All muuracturin.a CJO.O 19.l 16).6 3'(.) 
IJ&ht muuruturiD.1 130.) 10.1 Z46.I 3'2 
Food 842 16.9 ZIZ.3 43.-C 
Testlles 176.9 3.3 261.4 I.I 
Heavy lndustrJ 71.9 Z3.9 UH 32.-C 
~r &Z2 39.-c ZIZ.9 110.9 
Chemicals 3'(2 W5 952 U6 
lon-aetallic llin.erals CJl.7 29.) HZ.I 4U 
Metallurgy 72.8 12.7 91.l Z-C.O 
Biih tech CJI.) 8.) 137.l 14..1 
llachiD.ery 812 to 121.3 19.1 
Trusport equipment U:U 2.9 Z17.7 - 9.6 
Acricullure 57J 22.6 6U 2/,.7 
s.ra: FriUCll a. FllDl:O U9S9a) •las mr Ula rr. Bnp. II (1981. "· 
674-77). W1lcisled •ltiia limns la t .. l Yalae mlded. 
One implication ot this fact was to molivate a taritr reform in 1988 
with the purpose ot appro1imating legal and true tarltrs, along vilb tbe 
elimination ot a number ot ·special regimes·, vitb a view to reducin8 the 
amount ot ta1 eipenditures impliciUy involved in this policy regime. Tbus. 
taritrs were generally reduced aa:ross the board but enCorced to a larger 
e1teDL It should be llOted, however. that the aim ot the 1988 reform was to 
inaease rascal revenue, besides removing some "Water• Crom lal'.ifTs, and, 
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91¥en th9 Huie- al e•neralla9d admlnieva&l- oon~ ead lmport. 
problbllioos, las lmpllCl on the level ol proleClion W'IS rather mild. 
The peculiarity ol this system Is that Import ratiolll.Da ls largely made 
by measures that do nc;»t seem IO raise very significantly the cost ol imports 
that happen IO a"OSS the barrage ol administrative controls. Yet, it is not 1 
priori dear whether Importers transfer Into prices the ·scarcity premium· 
Involved In the cost ol lmporUng. In the case ol c:omumer goods Importers 
may surely appropriate lhe rents created by the QR system pricifta the 
· im.porl much .higher than il would normally do. lo the case ol intermediate 
and capital goods this may probably not happen because the errective import 
cost ls reduced by 1d-/Joe eiemolions ol duties ('lrue· tarirrs are small) and 
the scarcity premium on imports is irrelevant tor cost accounting ol tirms. In 
this case, the social cost ol the QR system does not represent any 
disbursement IO importing firms• and for this reason the domesllc prices ol 
imported goods. especially in the case ol intermediate and capital goods. are 
much smaller than they would be in a system ol taritt equivalents ol tbe Qls 
In force. This fact would have a very important bearing on the debate 
around the reform ol lbe Brllilian structure ot protectioa in the 1990s, as it 
will be seen in detail in Part Two. 
However, perhaps, lbe most impressive by-product ol this import 
policy ot ·eiceptions as a rute· and administrative decenttali7.ation is the one 
ol the Brllilian inf'ormat.ic:s policy. The control over imports ol loosely 
deflned ·mrormat.ic:s goods· by the Special Seaetariat ol Informatics CSEU 
bas given such a leverage IO tbe latter that, in addition to usual practiees 
suc:b. as. for ~11mple, requirements for a very hiah local content. it bas 
introduced specific procedures IO the regulation ol the computer industry 
such as restrictions on tedl.no1oRY transfer cootracts and, most importantly, 
IO foreign ovnersbip in some segments ol the industry. This bas represented 
a major departure from Bta!il's traditionally liberal stance toWards FDI, and 
bas raised a huge amount ot controversy. lo the late 1980s .the ·informatics 
policy" bas been inaeasiagly under au.act and its on-aoina rerorm bas 
become one ol the crucial issues tor the 1990s, to be discussed in Part Two. 
' tnepl in ........... cue or direct "acquisi&ioa" or iafort liceues Ulrougb 
C'9f"t'VptiDD., ill Ybidl cue Ule ICU'Cily real is appropriated by tbe bureeuciuy. 
.... Zl 
h lnt.erea&ina reaWnl cl &he Bru.lliao &rade nai••. lo be diac:uued ID 
more detail in &be nelt leC&ioG. ii &bat lmpon tultic:liom crea&e 1 
generalized anli-export bias. &bat 11 olr1et in 1pecirac iodu11tie1 by eaport 
iocelllivei lbal place aucb industries ln 1 more or leu aeulral regime. Tbis 
silualion - biah protec:tion u a rule and export 1ub1idie1 u 1 glorified 
e1c:eplion for eipor&ers - is in ltlelf' a dis&orlkm OD lbe dasaic Italic aeme 
calllna. acxxirdlng IO the callOOlcll formulae. tor a devaluation eu111 removal 
(or reduction) or eiport 1ub1idies and tarUf 1. Tbe Clbstacle IO Ulil 
aimpliricalion or the ltade regime is ·a 1t1dilioul one: lbe iDflat.ionary 
eomequeoces or real devaluationi. 1 coacern &bat the eiperience or lbe early 
t 9101 could only reiororce. Tbe 1barp e1cbange nae devaluaUom ill 1979 
and I 983 bave caused marted iDa'easel lo ioflal.ioa. and bave lna'eued 
resis&ences. or at least awareness. OD lbe part or domeslic 18CDll u IO. 
cbaoges in relative prkes•. 
This may be one or lbe causes ol tbe di.slllulionment Willl lbe cnvUDg 
peg system in lbe second ball' or lbe 1980.. Vlil.b tbe accelletation ol 
inllalion towards hyperi.oClation levels eubange raae management bas 
bea>me inaeasiagly difracult. u lbe lbin edge between generaliag 
appreciation and producio& i.oClalionary repercussions was a dliricull one ID 
keep up. More rreque01 episodes at appreciation could be observed araer 
1986 and an increased variance at tile real eic:hao8e raae is very dearly 
obsecved in tile 1980s: lbe merrac:ie01 at varialion at lbe real eKbaage raae · 
rose Crom numbers between2As and 31 ill die period 1973-78. ID numbers 
between 6.71 and 8.2s in 1979-1987, aild further IO 13.21 in 1988-902. 
New developmeDll in e1cbaoge rate policy among the rerorau at 1990, such 
u lbe new (dirty) floating e1cbaage raae regime, could be direc:Uy &raced &o 
sucb coocerns. 
tJ.2) Tbe iodus&cjal oromotjoo gmes 
I A discussion or U.. quaa&ila&iw iapect or dnalua&ioa aad latifr bibs ii c:oaduc&ed ia 
Put Two. 
2 r.oaputaid oa u.. bais or moD&bly oblena&iou. a. s..m (1990. p. 19'1). 
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.Up lo the MCIODd ball at &he llNea &he lundement.l influence on t.b9 
sect«al pattern d resource allocatloo in industry came form the laraely 
unintended imptet al import proCection undertaken on balance al paymenu 
. arounds. By that time, bowvet, the arovina dependence Oil imported 
Industrial Inputs led 10 the introductiOD ol eeverat nev lastrumetlt8 al 
ioduSlcial promotion aimed at building domestic capacity in large sc::ale, 
capital Intensive intermedllte goods. Stale inrerveDllon in Industrial 
iDveslmenl was conducted at two levels. ln a few sectors. most notably in 
petrocbemk:als and steel, outrlabt-: pu11at or full - public ovnersbip was 
paned. ln otbert, the · goverQment still played a crucial role through the 
· . admllllstratlon al powerful Instruments added IO Import proleCUoa -
· basically r11e11 incentives and subsidised Iona term aediL 
· Durlng Ibis period, the c:lassk:at lDlerac:tion between lnvard looting 
potic:ies and small market sla relative 10 bell-practice optimum sc::ales led 10 
bilb levels al CIODCll!ntntion in almost 111 the new seclOrS from the outset•. 
The creation ol 1 relatlvety stable otJaOpotistic structure was rehllorced by 
the mmblnatlon.al (l) 1 biah level al multinational penetration in response 10 
reatric:tiYe import barriers coupled wilb relatively llUle · 1ncerrerence In the 
PDI process; (ll) the cnaUOn oC ·ulional cbamp1on.s· by &be special 
protection- a1111-domeslic subsidies . treatment given IO domestic firms in 
some import substitution projeclS and stimulated by the concern with the 
aa~ al industrial ·eac1aves· llllt could be formed by vertically 
lntearated MNCs artltlates; (iii) ~le ownership in secaors requiring 1ar&e 
initial investment outlays. vbidl cnated in fact monopolistic public 
enterprises2. 
The basic features al the fnmewort ol incentives and regulations 
were rermecr and amolidaled durilll the very active POiicies followed from 
the late t 960s and, especially, in the t 970s, as a response IO the perceived 
structunl balance ol payments problems cnaled by the oil price rise, giving 
an impressive boost IO lnWltment In heavy! intermediate and capital goods 
industries. and in ~ t 980s as a resPoDSe 10 cballenae al adjustment 10 tile 
debt a-isis. Amoaa these features lt ii apt 10 empblsil.e: (i) the pervasiveness 
al rascal Incentives armted in a-edits by the state development bank BNDES 
I For a d"llCUSSion of the~ of mcll a procea, 1ee Mertaav (1971). 
2 For a ...... detailed dilcmsioa .. Fristcll 8. Franco (191911). 
and dired.ly by 10me aovernment bodies; (ii) reaulation eo.bancioa noo-
c:ooteslabllily ol markets, parlicul.arly the direct investment lli:iensing 
llmllatlons Imposed by secaoral or realonal bodies or by the medWllsm ol 
·secloral agreements• coordinated by tbe price control authority (CIP-
lntermirustry Coullcil ol Prices)•; and (ill) most importanUy, Ule imposilion 
d local ClOO&ent requirements (.lada.t de lllCiotulia~o ) by BNDiS -
derlned u tbe ratio between local a>St companents and &otal a>St ol a given 
product2 - as a requirement ror tbe accew IO its FINAME line ol subsidiDd 
credits ror acquisllioo ol capital goods, and by other government bodies (a>l) 
and state enterprises especially in tbe a>otelt ol public procurement 
cooaacu. A 1988 deaee would actually turn local content requirements 
enforceable in lbe production ol all goods receiving any rorm ol subsidy, 
pursbased by any public body or receiving any sort ol rinancing from ctricial 
institutions3 
Table 5 provides a rough picture ol lhe incidence ol lbese dispositiOns. . 
I Oil price control as a device to en.force eD.tty barriers see Fritsch~ Fraaco (198911). 
2 la. aoae cues iaports are considered at Clf values amelimes n.ot. aad the n&ios 
a...U...S are com.puled ill lel'IDS of "nichl. depeadiac Oil the tle..ad&Ag &gellcy. 
3 Art. 16, Decree 2-03. May 19, 1988. 
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S--11111111•1'e W•ld Bud: (1999. "· M-25). 
Nole that reaulalion ii aeneraUy liaht in trad~Uonal indU1.,iH, Hcept 
ror price eooltols in sensitive products ind 0n spec:irrc segmeDIS. \Vbe1t 
mlWDL ror eumple, II' subject IO capacily regulation entorced lbr'OUlb lbe 
rationing d imported wbeal Intermediaries are largely subject IO price 
controls, aiven their veigbt in 'Wholesale price inderes, there resulting biab 
eDlry barriers and a>mllnt complaints IS. reg1rd 1nti-c:ompetilive prldices, 
u In Ille arc:betypal cue d the cement Industry. 
In many industries the tey source d regulation IS regards productive 
capacity espansion and ·1dequate• levels d minimum domestic content vas 
the project evaluation Ktivity carried out by an, wbic:h v11 aeated in 1969 
ind Hlinc:t ln 1988. Tbe O>uncll also played ID lmPGrtant role In 
coordinllioo lbe ICtion d other tey bocfjes aucb as lbe BNDPS, some Jarze 
indUSltial public enterprises ud a>A. whk:b decided about tbe coneessioa d 
· 1tade-reJated tu eiemptions on imported inputs. A.ltbougb tbe amount d 
resources discretkmltily aranted IS beuellts under J:ndUtUiaJ promotion 
sc:bemes 'WIS substantial - amounting to betvieen 0.51 to 0.81 d GDP in lbe 
e1rly J 980t• - lbe buJt d these investment inceDt.ivet were CODCeDtr1ted in 
a few tlrgeted capital intensive intermedilliet: cbemicaJs and 
pb1rmaceutJca.1s represented .f3.JI d Jnvestments made under a>J. ud 
non-metallic IOOds including paper and cement, responded for 3.f.212. lo 
consequence these 9ett«s were subjea. u sbown in 1be table, to str.lngent 
JocaJ content requirements. Jn seaments aucb as beaYy (made-to-crder) 
capital IOOds. eledrical equipment ud ttasport equipment procurement 
rules on the part d public enterprises are the tey source d local mntent 
requirements. 
For capital Roods. more aenerally, tbe mcess IO FINAME credits -
available IO buyers d such goods at BNDFS - depends on bavina Ille product 
registered in a FlNAME listing with a pre-determined local content 
requirement ranaina between 701 and 151. On the inrormatics industry 
local content requiremenll are imposed by: SEI at very higb levels -~ 
901. lntereslingly, local content requirements are entotced oo tbe amsumer 
eledtoo.ics industry located at tbe Manaos Free Zone al substantially lover 
• ne .-orld&ul (1990>. 
2 Tboup IDpdler tbftl tw eroups reprwsenllld only J7T, er dle projects approftd by 
CDl. er. The World But (1990, p. 40. 
raUae - U"OUDd )OS - wbicll -• .-plod by tho lndu.&ry •• • t1uld-pro-e-
tor die permission not lo eiport more than IOI d their outpul Tbe 
importance d local content requirement IS import restriction device ror 
capital aoocts and parts cannot. lhererore, be underestimated: I.he share in · 
manutac:tured value added d industries in the table subject to some degree 
ol locat content requirement is slighUy over 501, an astonishing figure hhe 
•ore 90 IS one notes lbat 11 corresp00ds to modern industries) that bave 
audat impllcations IS reaards the conduct ol trade policy and more 
particularly IS retards. the process ol liberalizatloa to be implemented in the 
t 990s. IS discussed at length in Part Two. 
Furthermore lbe non-c:onteslabillty ti the industrial martet structure. 
especially in the modern seaments,· emerges very clearly Crom the table as a 
result d eiteasive reaulalion with a dear pro-incumbent bias, reinrorcing 
natural entry barrien. preventing eiit by distressed r1rms and aystalliziag 
martel poslllons•. This very larae degreed trade and industrial regulation 
and aovernment interference with the competitive process mai.ntened ror so 
long in Brazil seem to have bad a rundamental negative impact on 
eall"epreaeurial behaviour and i.ndustcy efficiency, u i1 rewarded rent 
seeking and inhibited manaaerial awareness or the strategic importance or 
the acquisition d lecbnological capability. Tb.is is particulary dramatic at a 
time when there are very rapid changes in the post-war technological 
paradigm upon Wbic:h Brazilian industrial capability was bui.11. and when 
conUnued manuflclUred HP«Jfl dynamism rests fundamentally on 
technological upgrading. For t~ reason lbe reforms to be undertaken in 
trade and industrial policies in the t 990s seem to place industrial 
deregulation and competition polic:y in a privileged place. 
Tbese issues were not a>asidered ·in the 1988 dea'ees tnown as ,.be 
New Industrial Policy", that attempted to create a system ot joint planning 
·ror vertically integrated sectors (industrial compteres) managed by •sectoral · 
cbamben. unitiag business usoc:ialions ~d bureaucrats with powers to 
establish Investment plans (PSl-Pro6r11111sSe10r/Ris /Dfelndos) that would 
be liable to a number ti rlSClll and regulatory iacentives. These proposed 
reforms can be thouabl a an attempt to advance the symbiosis between 
I As fercefuUy upecl ia Tile World Bat (1990) ,_,;. . loa-c:oalelt.lbilily is used 
llere ill Ille UIUll .... uaely. as u lllribute or utbls ia nicb iacumllea.ts are 
llOl lllNeleaed .., eatry or potential com.petition. 
bureaucncy and reaulated raraul wbjcb would actually maaniry di9tortiom 
deriviaa rrom apuriouJ regulation cfuc:usted above. ID.lefestingly. tbe 
mordinalioll difr1CUllles Histing vilbio teel«ll c:bamben precluded lbe 
constitution fJl any but one sectoral PSI (m the aellile industry) up lo 1990. 
Fortunately. the l 988 reform was • failure bringina DO •ialliracant ebaages iD 
prior arrangements. 
t.4J ne ••rces er •K,.rt ,,..~ 1a .... rac1ar1a1 
A crucialteature fJl the evolution fJl a>mpeUtiveness indices a>mpuled 
ror Brazil ror the period 1970-852, and rear1rmed more recenUyS ii that the 
improvement is uniformly observed throughout lbe period. the reeeoioG 
and devaluations d the early 1980s baviaa. thererore. Ollly reinforced these 
tong term trends, marking DO dear descontinuity Wilb respect lo lbe 4t1Sl 
Even so there bave been coamrm on vbetbet eiporl growth ill lbe 19801 
bas been due to ·reversible. iDfluences s&emmina rrom sbort letm 
llUla'OeODllOmic management (recession ind eD:bange nae undemluation) 
or from ercesslvely generous export promotloo proarams. generating what 
bas been called ·spurious· a>mpetiliveneu4. 
ll was alto observed tbal the improvement iD competitiveness is more 
or less unirorm aaoss aec:tors. In this coanectioa. one may surely rmd 
Hectscber-Oblin insoired e1olanalioas ror the successru1 export performance 
in labour and natural resource intensive industries, but one may alto 
observe the development d (er-po#) comparative advantage iD produc:h 
one should not e1pect a labour and natural resource abundant country to be 
Ible to. When considering Brazilian successful performance iD t.edlnologically 
more intensive industries one is led to explanations empbasiziDg Cac:IOrS like 
scale eeonomies, product differentiation and learnina-by-doina. along the 
tines fJl the so called ·nevi trade theories·, a8 well IS eiplanatioas related to 
the significant presence d MNCs in Brazilian trade and. processes IS the· ones 
I ninss usaeet emerged rroa a aeeliaot a,ens ia ICJll. see l&lescG U981. p. 14). 
2 F~ •Fnaco U9&9a). 
5 See Honaemberg (1990) 
.. BJ .FajalJJller (19&3). 
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the e1ac:t nature ol the relation between market structure reatures. 
productivity growth and trade perCormance, and more precisely I.be eitent 
to which eiport performance is a-eated by ·exogenous· ractors related to 
toi'eign ownership or to ·endogenous· Cldors connec:ted to productivity 
growth and the ·maturation· ol once ·inl'ant• national r1rms. 
This section treats In. two separate sub-sec:tioas maa-o and 
microeconomic determinants d Brazilian mmpetitiveoess io manufacturing, 
tbe operation d whk:b is not mutually eidusive. Tbe rirst subsection treats 
mllCl'OemllOmic mnuences on trade performance. devoting speciaJ attention 
10 eipon Jncenlives ad mecbausm to by-pass tbe very beavy strUC\ure or 
f:'IClleClkm ID fCJrCe. Tbe nat tub-teelioD considers . determinants of 
compethivenen ll90dated witb market structure u well u with policies 
and environmental cooditicms favouring JearniDg ad iecbnoJogical 
bmcwation. 
1.4.l) Maqoemoomic and policy Clldq's in mmoetltiyeoess 
A 1983 survey• ol tbe extensive ec:onometric work linking the 
behavior d aggregate manufactured eiports to maaoemnomic variables 
Q1Yefing the 1960s and 1970s ,-ould reveal that. despite I.be richness oC 
m.elhodological details, lbe essential elements oC these eiercises were very 
similar: a q11111111111 index ror manufactured eiport.s. or their value at 
mastant dollars, was regressed against variables such as real eicbange rates 
(adjusting ror subsidies and tu incentives so as ro interpret it as eiporters' 
returns), world demand, and c:yclic:al Innuences usually defined as deviations 
rrom a productive capacity variable (oCten potenaal output). The results ror 
price and world income. elasticities have . displayed a great amount ot 
• I I 
maslstem:y: an unitary elastidty Is mn.sldered ·reasonabte· ror lb.e rormer 
aa.d a value between 2.0 and 3.0 are mmmonty routtd ror I.be latter (p. 723). 
Domestic demand 'VIS round to be an important negalive inCluence on 
1kaz:llian e1ports (a minus oae elasticity), asserting a dear "vent-for-surplus· 
...... &.llarhaJcl(JCJ83). 
kialc lo Bradlian eaporta, • reaull lo be eapeded fw • coun&ry wilb a Iara• 
domestic market and in wbk:h eiports repraent a marginal activity for most 
e1porting farms•. More recent wort employiog supply and demand 
apecificalioos and a disequilibrium methodology mostly coaC'armed these 
reaulla2. 
Tbc ia.rerpretatioa. ol tbe1e e1erc:iael' involve IOGle impotlaDl inues. 
Tbt: inCl.uence ol capacity variables is not Often made ei:plidl u equatiODs 
generally coosider deviations from potenc:ial output. or, at most. trend 
variables, so tbat structural fac:tort arrec:tiog eiport performance become 
bidden in une1plained produelive capacity inc:reues in eiportiaa industries. 
A superfic:ial readiog ol Ulis Werature would tend. therefore, IO 
overempbasiD demand factors, and more especil'ically IO COGvey the 
impression ol a cootradictioo between the eipott led and domestic market 
led growth. Aa:ordiog IO &his readiog an e1por1 surge may be geoerated by a 
domestic rec:essi.oo. crealina a typical instance ol ·spurioul·, or reversible, 
competitiveness. 
On lhe price aide it ii imporlaDl to distinguish between lhe ell'ec:&.s ol 
e1c:baage rate policies ·and ol eiport subsidies, and most arguments 
empbasidng ·arurteiar a>mpetitiveness underline the weight oC the latter. In 
this CX>Onection it was shown tbat the value ol eiport incentives in effect in 
8razil from the late. 1970s on was very substantial. A ·recent study reports 
that. for l 98<l, the aggregate value ol all e1port incentives reached ~8.71 ol 
the FOB value ol e1ports, 35.51 referiag to rebates and eiemption.s oC 
; : 
indirect ta1es. 9.ll refering to benefits associated wilb. draw-back 
operations and the rest (-C.l S) produced by subsidized credit and income ta1 
reductionsJ. Even consideriog that 213 ol the indirect ta1 incentives are 
a>mmon in foreign trade operations (the eiemption applies IO avoid double 
tauli.on ol the same value added), and that these estimates were based on. 
the unrealistic assumption that in the absence ol the incenlives the same 
amount ot e1ports and idiports would bave bappened that is. that foreign 
trade bas no sensitivity to the presence oC incentive,, these values are high 
and raised a number ol cxmoerns. 
1 This laber feature nuld be lim clear ia lhe l&ler ,.norlhe 1980s. 
2 See 'Rios (1917) and ZiAi Jr. (1919). 
s ..... a. aao ... u. <t•7. ,. Go(). 
The nr.t and 1DC1N obvioue la &bal U. n.c.1 CIOlll of Hport promotion 
wu too biab. but it ws also commonly userled that its benefits were 
distrlbuled on 1 regressive rasblon•, and that lbe weight ot incenUves 
demoastraled tbe ·1rtif1Ciar nature ol Brazilian eiports. Interestingly, it was 
observed that ~ otracial justification for the concession ol such benerit.s bas 
been bued on the argument ol lhe necessity to otraet lhe cost pressures 
derived rrom the tarllr structure"2. Indeed, ror 1 country In wtl1cb the rate ot 
effective proCection is very bighS, the anti e1port bias would be generally 
wry high if not otrset by export promotion. ICbemes attemptina to plac:e 
e1porter1 on 1 more or leu neutral regime. Indeed, on average, one may 
observe 1 small posilive 1Dti-e1port bias ror the 8ralillan economy ror u 
late as t 980- t 98 t, with, bovever, a large dispersion. i.e. with sectors highly 
inward oriented and others OD 1 more or less neutral stance4. Interestingly, 
in this coanection, il bu been round 1 positive and signili.cant (rant) 
corre1allon between errec:tive rates oC DC'OleClioll and raleS oC eioort 
promotion- 0.626 tor 1973 and 0.723 tor 19775 - suaesting therefore that 
export incentives are designed to neutralim the anti-eiport bias cnated by 
the current structure ot prOCectiolL 
An imoortant instrument conceived to by-pass tbe stcuc:wre or 
protection vu the BVIEX program.. It consisted basically in allowing ta1 
exemptions OD imports and the run clearance ot ·similarity· eiaminations ror 
inputs and capital goods in e1cbange ror eiport commitments assumed by 
importers never below lbe double ot tbe value or allowed imports. The 
eom.milm.ents are dravn in multi-year mnll'acts that. initially, were mostly 
signed by MNCs afalliates. Over tbe years the program bas turned into a 
·mechanism through wbidl natiooal rarm seek to reduce import ta1:es on 
capUat goods imports and to circumvent ·similarity'" e1:aminaUOns"'. i e. a 
scheme through wbic:b e1:portina rarms could get aocesss to imports without 
. wbidl competitiveness would not obtain and that would be otherwise 
I Bnga(J4J&J) 
2 ... (I.,, p. '6). 
S For lfJll ERP wold be 53.3~ muideriai ·i.aplicil· protectiDo. i e. computiag •true• 
lllrifrs damagb d"anc& priee c:oapuill>u. aad 167 . .ft. mnsideriq lepl Witrs. Bnp et 
al UCJU. p. C>. 
4 T)1er Cl4J83. p. '6(). 
' ..... {lCJll. p. 67). ,.._.... u-.. pp. 15-16). 
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uornc:beable. The pr'Olnlm'• ettediveaeu can be a1seued by tile fact tbat. 
u .een Table 2. ezports under tbe program ioaeased more thin tenfold 
rrom 1974to1981, and rourrold during 1982-89. Tbis resUlled ID a rourrotd 
increase ID tbe trade balance under tbe program rrom 1978 to 1980, and 
another sevenf'old inaeue rrom 1912 to 1919. Tbe share d MNCs ID the 
program's ezports fell signifk:anUy afler tbe mid 1970s. and tbe program'• 
stun ID manufactured ezports illa'eased rrom161 iD 197~79, to 231 ID 
1910-14 (aprotimatety 31 d imports), reac:biDg •tiahtly over 501 ·in 1917, 
where it remained since•. The e1perietlce dearly suaests tbat a binding 
element in ezport orienled pro;ec:ts is the wry restrictive struc:ture d 
proleCliDn ID operation. 
Tel>le2 
&portsud tnde llalallce under Beriex ud or roreiln farms. 1972-a, 
Bera pmcraa 
.....,.. s or for. tnde colltrlda aar. s 
DK nports" Cum ""'"C!• tpta1 MJ1Ct Ul!OrP 1IJ'Jn 
l97Z 2 100 -10 2 2 acJI 0.0 
t9'1J 70 100 -too 3 3 1.0t ... , 
197( 212 100 -72 J 2 2.263 U 
lm Jn 100 63 .c 3 2.5M 12.9 
1915 oQ6 91.5 17-t ti -t 2.'116 16.-t 
tm 655 902 JO 5 3 3.MO 11 JJ 
19'11 165 88.4 zzz 10 5 5.083 17.0 
lm t.tt9 122 6"46 16 J 6M5 tu 
1'9118 t.793 7-l3 1.068 n 12 9,921 11.9 
Hit 2.581 77:5 t.188 35 ( 11.IM 21.7 
IC 2.ro 70.6 l.031 79 25 10.253 ZU 
1913 2.935 60.6 z.uo 25 7 tt.z76 K8 
1'84 3.172 58.0 2.865 4( It 15.102 26.t 
1915 ~· ~ 3.603 4( 15 1(.062 35.5 
1916 5.i21 l.L 4.4>5 l.L l.L 12.386 (1.( 
1917 7,629 1.L 6,912 ILL ILL 14.831 51.( 
191& 9.573 a.a. S.7H u. a.a. 19.902 G.l 
1919 l.ffl 1.L l.JJ9 ILL l.L 19,'9( 48.] 
s..us: ... & Morein (1987, ..... 5.7, 111111&)111111 r..sa Meraatll • ..., 
2'1 .. 1991 •• * ...,1e lticlw*e •It mrpartlll& Arm wllll , ...... _..... • 
wu-. .......... 
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ln addition to mac:roecooomic: ianuencn ind eiport promotion 
demes, several Olber •11ruc:turaf' elements 1re importut to nplain the 
evolution d compelitiveDess aver tJme. Amons these, tbe debate bas 
developed mOllly wer the reJaUve Jmpor11Dce d ·enc1oponou1· 
mec:bnl1m1 rela1ed to Jem"DIDl-bY-doJna aod ICIJe economies to npJain 
produclivity arowtb dlll 1CDOmplniel the process d •maturation· d 
predominantly natioDIJ firms iD maouf'acturina and •nogenous• fntluences 
mOllly lfJ'ec:tiDg trade propemitJel d enabllabed MNCI lfJ'iliates tbrougb 
llfGCeaeS d lloblDDUon aod rldooallzatkm d ld.Jvi1Jes within MNCs 
delClibed JD delail JD the nut teetJon. The importance usually att8Cbed 10 
•enctcieenous• elements bas bee.D reinforced by the recent proemineoce d 
the so called ·new trade tbeories. wbicb deYoLe areat emphasis to tbe role d 
IDdUSUill araaJza1ioD features ID aeat.lna competitiveness. More 
tpedf'icllly, most lladell Ilana tbete Jines associa1e, tbougb in • 
delerm1nitUc fmion, IDcreates ID Ille, « ID rents CDDDeCled to iDdustrill 
. CCIDCleldl1ILia or even 10 prGCectioD ad ·mar.tel reserves·, to areater 
elJ'JcleDcy eh.bet 1brou1b ICIJe economJes. Jell'Dina-bY-doina « .R & D 
illYestment I. 
It is important to bave in mind, bowever, tbat the empiric:al evidence 
9UpportiDg lllis neo-Slwmpeletiaa c:ooaectioa. between size ind ia.DoYation 
(emcieocy).pn 'WbJdl dlete m~lt .mosUy rely. ls ralber illconduslve2. Tbe 
same bolds. bowevet, ror tlie1 more ortbodol association between 
productivity ll'O'lltll aad the trade regim.e3, indiallilla the comple1ity ol tbe 
Issue. llUlCMllive ICliYity is commonly related to pen:ieived market 
oppartanl1ies4, wbk:b me otr.en usoc:iated to market 111.e and growth - and. 
1 Eaaples are rrapaa UfJl4) aad Rodril <torUacomiaa). 
2,... ftC'elll .UV41J .. Scb .... (JCJM). . 
s "TIM:n .is•• dear eu1. cealinuliu or &be .by-"'esis &bat C111U111tries ,,;u. ea ateraaJ 
erieet81icm tieae:lil Ina paler &rwdl iD tecla111ieal .::!j,c:ie:lllCJ iD llae compcmeal 
aectM'S ........ actllrillla; coMiJlledyilJa &be reJatjyely Slllic costs or prot.edicm. 
UaisliHiD& Jeaes&bose 1'ilJt a~ tnards a 111eutn1 regime .iD a...,...,., •• 
cf. r.ct <t.U.ceaillla. p. JI). fHeed. &be fact &bat &be eapirieal araumeats for dd'etldilla aport ,,. • ..-. ril-~r# m,PQrt •bslilaliolll on &be .,_..,or teclaaieal 
eflidtacy are smpJy Ml lbere. ns nea Maiued ti, Blaqwat; UCJU. pp. JC)-40. For a 
~ wl&cu!Siaareal'iraiaa &bae n:suJls w 1'JIMlut (1990). 
4 See Pll9iU U•). 
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especially in developina couwie1, tor .... OVDel'Sbip - and rar lea de11tly 1o 
other elemenb of the competitive environment. aucb u ror eumple iolra-
l'irm rivalry 1nd eue of elllty and erll. u noted by Fz&u (1984) Ill lhe 
CDlllelt oC mntrasb in innovative activity in tbe OECD area, by Teitel ( l 984), 
latz ( 1984) and Dahlman et 1L ( 1987) in Ille conten of a disc:ussioll of inrant 
industries and tec:bnology acquisition in tbe Third World and by Bria• & 
1'Wmore (1989) in Ille Bruillan cmtell 
Tbe empirical literature 1ddressiag the relation. between eiport 
performance 111d industrial organir.ation reatures ror the Brazilian cue bu 
devoted great allentioll to the monedion between Hporl performance, r1rm 
111.e (or mni:elllrltioa.). ind roretan ovnersblo. In eitber cue. bavever. lbe 
maetbods used in controlling for other influences. or to purge multimtinearity 
prcblems from cross-section regressions, are a'Udal to assert Ille eiistence of 
any meaniagrul OXUleCl1on. The r1rat entries in this lilerature use• a 1978 
income tu database lnduding I), I zz reporliag r1raas from w1llcb Braga 
( 198 I) sought to investigate. the distribution of eiport ince1ltives ICCOl'ding 
to r1rm sir.e, ownership and regional location.. It WI round indeed lbat 
incenlives were appropriated mostly by larger rarms. MNCs lfilliltes (whose 
sbare oC incentives was round IO be taraer lban lbal oC e1poru) and rk:ber 
regions, but the multimliaearity problems involved were by ao means 
coatroUed. 
TIUs same data were used by CF.PAL ( 1983) to assert Ille lact of 
difference in eiport propensilies between national ind rorelgn rirms. both 
directly and through a comparison using the maldled pairs methodology. 
The procedure was heavily a-iticil.ed ror it did not control tor rarm sir.el, a 
problem dial was not present in Braga & Guimatles ( 1986 ), wbo used an 
enlarged version of the same data set. to run rearessioGS oC eiport 
propensities on variables lite industrial concentration. 9Cllle economies, 
capacity utWmt.ion, rorelg~ ownership, tradeability (proiied by geographical 
dispersion oC proc1uc:tio.l wilhi.D tile couit.try), capital ia.teasily, erport 
ilKentives and I Ir. D ialensily. The study re&rll'med lhe relation found in 
arlier studies of macroeconomic nature mentioned in lhe last sub-section 
between es:port performance and iDcetllives and domestic demand. The 
study also mnrarmed the eipecred positive relatiOn betweea eiport 
I Wm.on (1985, p. 620). 
pel'foraanm and llrm eili8 vwiablH - 0000.ntra&ioa. eaale -• and R 
IL D iDleaslty - but failed r.o Identify 1 signiriclnt lafluence cl foreign 
ovnenblp on e1port performance. Rowver. 1 aerioUI sbortromiag ID the 
ldentifalion cl foreign r1rms in the t 971 data set resulted In 1 very 
signiranl underestimation cl their presence in Bruilian industry• turaina. 
evldeGlly, die madusioas cl the studies m.entiooed above, especially when 
lnwtvina foreign owersbip. quite questionable. 
A more recent study - Willmore (1915) - using tbe 18'1te 1971 data 
tel. but properly ideotifyiag foreign rarms, CIOllduc:led ID HleDSive 
mm.parison cl national and foreign f1tm.s usiag the melhodology cl malehed 
pairs Wilh resuUs substaollally different from the ones cl early studies. 
Am.ona several important dirrerenms between utional and foreign Cirm.s it 
vu round tbat the tauer e1ported 1 much larger proportion cl their output 
lban national r1rm.s cl the same sir.e even &bough lbey do AO! receive a larger 
slme cl e1port IDcenlives. 
Aaotber study by tbe same autborZ focusing on tbe iafluence cl 
industrial orpnir.ation features on e1port performance used • sample ol 
17,0)3 Orm in llllllUfac:turiaa for 19803, 652 ol wb.icb foreign. Tbe main 
cmcluslou cl tbe study were lbal proleCtion and vertic:at lnlegration have a 
strong negative iafluence on erporl (and import) perf ormaoce, and that 
advertising intensity (an indi.c:ation ol product dirrerenUation) and size have 
I SU'oag posilive erfed. Jnterestiaaly, however, the influence cl Sim depends 
on die values cl other 1Ddeoea4e~ variables, the most plausible situation 
being one in whicb. no correlation muld be found between e1:port-output 
ratios (and import-output ratios) and total output. ercept ror erceptionally 
large (a positive correlation) · or erceptionally small fttau (a negative 
mrretation). · 
In addition, foreign ovnership was found r.o have a strong and 
independent influence on erport performance and import propensilies, the 
' tatter being stronger. lnd6ed, ror lhi.s t980isam.ple tbe eiport-import ratio 
tor foreign firms was 1.13. much smaller tban tbe r.al.io ror domestic firms 
(eQMX'len) namely 2.CM, a situation that was reversed in the mid 1980s, 
I rums CIODll'olled lty laoldiap ......... ill Bnzil but c:oDJnu.d lty foreiga nsideata 
,,.... mmidered u&ioul finis. See 'Willmore (I..,. pp. 624~). 
2 'Willmore (19171>). 
'S 'lllose COlll>iaed esports repl'llellfed 74 or Bnzili&n maeuractured eQOrts. 
when the esport-import ratio f• foreign r ... , roee to wlues •round 3.0 
(for 198.C-0) while the one lot national litms rose ro 1.71. Tbi.s amuing 
Improvement In lbe ttade performaace d lorelan rarms can be larlely · 
credited to lbe flCl that large international firms poueuiog Inherent 
competitive advantages In lntemalionat markets (e. a. martellaa channels) 
and superior managerial fleribWly are generally believed ro relCl •rtoaalY. 
presumably more lban a.ational r1rms d OlhetWise similar c:barlc:lerislics. ro 
changes in lbe lrade poUc:y environment. as discussed at length in tbe ae1t 
lediolL Moreover, &here Is c:ircumstantial evidence dial. foUoviag the rU'st 
oil •boct. lbe usual export requirements aaociated willl mccess ro subsidies 
wre complememed by inlormat but ettecllve Import Umitalioa Wgets 
imposed with special 1881 on inlefnalionat firms by lbe import licensing · 
authorilies. 
In 1um. lbe evideace seems ro indicate dial both size and foreign 
ownenhiP elhett 1 positive influence on eroort performance. Tbe dlannets 
through wb.ich ·e1ogenous· influences operite through foreign rarms viU be 
ellensivety explored in the nert seetioa. As regards the predse nature d lbe 
relation between size, and other rrm dw'lc:terislic or martet stl'UCWte 
features. and technolo&icat sttategies, and lloW the lauer evolve inlO erport 
performance, or more generally in.to productivity arowth. lbe mechanisms 
are much less clear. Between the rather general and ereeediogly 
deterministic nature d models d the "New Trade Tbeory" type and the 
rather spedf1e nature d firm. case studies d 1ua:essru1 tedulololical 
acquisition• there is vast une1pttXed terrilory for meaninatut erplaaatiom. 
The coolribution w ..MNCs to Brazilian t;111nulac:tured etoorts. esoecially 
in more \edmology intensive sedOn. provides a plausible e:rpJalUon ror 
tbe applftDUy pur.zlina fac:\ Utat Brazil eihibilt codl,...UVe advantaae iD 
sec.tan one s.bouJd no\ eipect a labor ad natural resource abundant country 
t See biz (118() for a re\'ieY. 
z this sediDn draft rroa Frilscb • Fruco <rorthmlllia& .. ). 
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to lmw. The ..,,.,&ae laporlaDm af MNCa ln Bruilian tnde ehould be ... n 
U related to tbe trading oppol'.lUDllJel opened by the processes. d global 
'ftrlkal lnlegratlon and worldwide sourciDL In wbldl MNCs bave been 
playina the leading role. and ror wbidl strategic planning by gtcbatty minded 
MNCs operatiag ID global oligopolittic sttuc:tum is crucial This section seeks 
to e1p1ore tbe DelUS between fDI IDd outwardness in more general lerms 
and then IO assess MMCs laflueoce on Brulllan arade and lndusttiali1Jltioll 
pallerm. 
1.5.1) MNr.s. outvlrd orientatioo and industd1Ur.ation in NlCs 
Current orthodoty in the normative analysis ol industrialization and 
trade patterns. by placing eiduslve emphasis on the determitlina iDRuence 
of domestic policies. bis lost sight of the importance ol eiogeoous 
developments lfrec:ting the behavior ol internalional c:orporaUons in sbaping 
Clbsenecl manufactured eiport performance in developing countries. For 
most Latin American economies. and ror tbe larger ones ia particular. the 
presence ol Coreiao capital bu readied such a dimension dult many 
struclUl'lt reawres ol these ecoaomies. Including Icade orieot1tioa. are 
crucia1Jy afJ'ec:led by .FDI. Yet, although bosl country's trade policies ad 
IVUdural flden sbou.ld In principle act cm establisbed arrwates iD tbe same 
way u cm domestic r ... ms d equal attributes, tbe ·outward orientation· d 
MNCs 111lllaiet may dlfl'er from domestic rJrms' lnsdar as &IObally minded 
llN:t respond to a much broader environment \ban lbe one shaping tbe 
dedsicms d domestic nrms. It is iDtereslina. in tbis connectkm \bat, several 
studies searcbiDa for dilTerences iD ~ aientation between MNCa lf'l"'iliates 
and domestic nrms in Latin American countries in tbe sillies and early 
wventies bave found eJport propensity, i. e: e1ports as percentqe d output, 
d MNCI lf'l"'Jliates to be yery low and lower, or at most statistically no 
dilJ'erent ,\ban lbe ones ior domestic r ... ms•. Jn recent years tbis situaticm 
bas apparently c:banaed. as tbe evidence seems to suaest \bat foreiaD 
cmwersbip eiber\ a stn:ma efJ'ect on botb eiport performance and import 
propensities d iDdiYidual r .... s. as teen in detail ror tbe Bnzilian cue in tbe 
Jul leCtian. 
•s..ror .... leWattlt&.~(1~) 
Bvidence ba1 been IOI.id on lbe arovinl outward orientatioo·cl MN<A 
amuates in the leadiag Latin American emnomies: e1port propemllles cl 
majority onwed US MNCs amuaies in Latin Am~k:ll bave increased rrom 
6.2s in 1966 to 20.11in1986, while ror Brazil the ina'eue was rrom 3.01 to 
17 . .Cs and ror Meiieo rrom3.21 to 3.C.81. The average erport propensities oC 
lfrdiates loclled in all regions tbe incteue wu from 18.61 to 38.Js. 1his 
meaning tbal Latin America, and Brazil certainly. is still betov the averaae•. 
This lime pattern oC eiport propensities appears to suggest tbat MNCs' 
erporl orientation reinforced overall inward orientation in tbe earlier stages 
ol industrialization in Lalin America and its growing •ocitwardness· in receDl 
years. 
Tbe dil'J'erences in apart propensities d MNCs in tbe I 960s and in the 
J 980s could be apJained by tbe fad that 1.bey rtler 1o difJ'erent "vintages• 
d foreign investment Indeed, tbe rn ma;ar waved iDtematioDaJ direct 
Jnvestment Jn tbe J 9SOs and J 960s, domJnaied by US and European nrms 
("'lbe American QalJenae. and tbe "Jiuropean Response·). bas bad its 
delermJnnts neatly desc:nbed Ilona Hymer-Cndleberaer Imes. er aloDI tbe 
Jines d jalm Dmming's ·ededic tbeory"2. Tb.is "Bymenan· wm d US FDJ 
was predominantly teared to domesUc martets. as tbe very Jaw eiport 
propensities d foreign subsidiaries in La1.iD America up 1o 1.be 1970s seems 
10 illustrate. 
Meanwhile, the e1ttaordinary worldwide extension oC subsidiaries 
networts hive induced 1 cbange in outloot ror MNCs. Wllidl seemingly 
ceased to be 'Tederalions oC aut.onomous subsidiarierS and engaged into 
efforts oC rationalization on a global scale wilh ample consequences as 
regards trade orientation oC individual atrdiates4. lt is natural co erpec:C. in 
lbis conneclion. intra-r1rm trade co grow signiflcanUy, '1lidl is indeed 
observed in lbe sillies and seventies. Moreover. the growing 
I ....._ 0917. ,. 20 ud 1,ag. lables AJ. BJ and.CJ). 
2 Firas iD ~ or u ·uaique ~. ua~Je by meus or u90nbl1 froJD 
UM: ....,_, cwalty (lllus I.he aeed lo jua9 trade barriers ia LMia AAerica ud ia 
.EWope) • .,. by ws or llcensiaa (SllQ ....tee,, 'ftft too' I.hi.a), Qoose 1o as•'lisll 
alf"lliales iD Jocmoas ia YhiQ .,_ .an.ctiftaess is ,,...icled by aarlet lize ud arwua pnspeas. llbour cosas. acmraaea& iacealifts. and Ollaer possi1tJe .locltioaaJ 
.......... a.111utni.D1 0979) · 
S JWter UW6. p. ~>. 
4 See Yenuta nm> on • realldq or Ille product cydt -*I poinda& ro &bis ._ 
directioa. 
lnlernatlonatiDUon ol MNCs ls al the rool ol lbe intensiflcatlon ol the· Iona 
run process ol worldwide industrial redeployment. as an important part ol 
lhe transfer ol industrial capacity IO the South corresponds IO the relocalioll 
ol industrial (erporling) capacity within MNCs•. These transfers have implied 
important changes in patterns ol trade and industrializ.ation in NlCs, among 
wbich lbe im:reaslag share ol MNCs in manuractlRd eiporu rrom some 
NlCs. especially in Lalin Americ:a. One may condude. thererore. I.bat the 
specir1C trade orlentatioa embodied. in the dUTerent waves ol ina>ming 
foreign investment would lnn.uenc:e very sigo.ificanUy the outward 
oriealation ol the industl"ializatioa drive in host dewlopiag muntries2. 
t.5.2) ml •od oauems oC industriatiT.ation •od tr•de in Brazil 
Two distinct phases. distinguished by the implied outward orientation, 
can be identif'&ed in the Brazilian postwar industriatir.alion experience: the 
rarst. was mostly a response IO incentives to domestic production created by 
toreign ercbange shortages rrom the late rorties, and corresponds ao the 
classic ts pattern. During this period FDl sought protected sectors with a 
view at e1ploring a large and rapidly arovinl domestic market otherwise 
uareac:heable through eiports rrom the home country basis. and made a 
dedsive CODlribulioll to import substllulioll and grOWlb. especially in 
modern segments ol mnsumer durables. mechanical and electrical 
equipment and a number ol basic inputs and capital goods industriesS. 
This rltSl WIW ol f1)} in Brazil in the post-war period was 
c:barac:terislic:a.lly Hymerian: an aulhorllaUve 1962 survey among us firms 
J See ferfdlll8pJe U,., le ~is (14Jl7l. 
2 nae fad lbll &be &be Jaraer .La&ia AJDericu ecoDoaies uperiencecl an important 
ia6as&ria1iza&i drive clmiD& &be -ityaenu• phue, •bile &be Asian HJCs. for 
iaslaace. llild &heir "1ale-affs• Ua IUIU of produdioJl of reJalively 90Jbisticaled aoods a 
JiUle JU.er. al a time •hea foreign mTe:sllDd\ -ns a1rady aorc ·ouwanl oriu1.ed", 
a&J tae.IJI IO eaplaia &be diJTereaces ha Uldustrial aders' &ndeability • and. especially 
.. ll of lbeir iateraaliCIDaliled segmeab - betwee111 &be &Yo areas. For a more 4letailed 
4isc:micm ~Frilsclli lcFruco <forlbcoaiaa-al. 
S See 11orkJ ltSailb (1971) ud Fri1'Cll ltFruco (forlbeaaiag-b. cllapter Z) for an 
meaWdismssioa. 
established in Bru:lll besides underlining the importance ol •• larse and 
potentially rapidly growing martet• notes further U..l ·m genenl 
preservalion ol 1n established &radiag posiUoo 1ppe1t1 IO be 1 more 
powerful motive for inveslmenl in. foreign manufacturing establishments 
thin e1reru1 e1tculalions ot sborl run prospects ot prot"dability"' (p. ta) and 
1bo that ·the major single motive for undertaking m1aul1Cturing ac:tlvilies 
abroad is the desire. IO secure or maintain a foothold Ill 1 generally auracuve 
m1rl:et wbere government JlQlic:ies .leave no means ti accomplisbing lids 
Clbjec:tive otber than by dJrect investment·(,. JG). 
Tbese patterns seem 1o m very mudl tbe dassic ffymer-cinclieberaet 
CleScriplioD d lbe detetmJnanu d PDI whicb emplllSires a sequeoce d 
decisions by rrms in possession ti ·unique assets• uneiploi\ab.le by means d 
ticleDsina. Tbey would rather serve foreip marl:ets from bome based 
npcrts. but ii' this poniblliiy is bkded by trade restric:\kms, \Ile alternative 
Jen Js \be establisbment ti a subsidiary2. Jn fact one can easily 1r1ue that 
lbe "lbeory. was IClually no more tban an er-pt/61 rationalization d the 
musive muh.inat.ionalization d US firms wwards Latin America and liurope 
.ner J947. Thls -mward oriented"' in\el'Daliia\ioa d oligopolistic structures 
geared to domestlc: martets ot .bast counlr.ies vas t.berefore typical t.be 
Miydsy ot import substituting industrialization in Brazil in t.fJe nrues. 
During the Jater .iavestment spuru roJJowing \be recession in \be early 
J 960s foreign rrrms advanced in all nan-vadiUo.oaJ sec:\Or'S, and, during t.fJe 
seventies, \.be presence ot us r.irms vu substantially reduced reJa\ive IO 
rJras d Jiuropen and Japanese origin vbose trade propensities were 
t:ianif"tc:atJy higher tban \Ile ones or \Ile former. Ju is common, among 
propooats d \Ile ·Japanese moder d foreign investment3, vbkb was 
iD.i\ialJy c::onceiYed a a strategy tor reJocatiDg eipons made UDClOmpetitiVe 
by reaJ vaae .inaeues and natural resource sbortqes in Japan, 1o describe 
lbe -US Moder d FDI geared at domestic marl:ets, \hat js. \M Hymerian 
pattern, a ·anti trade oriented'". Tbe c:ontru\ as regards trade propensities 
Japanese and US FDJ is evident as Japanese PDJ was a strategy d adjustment 
1o rising fK'ter prices carried out essentially by marainaJ rrms in relatively 
I Gordon Ii Grvaaers (lCJQ). The study is .... Oil emum iatervieft ... Yilh 36 
1J$ rlnlS durilll 1960 ud 1961. 
2 See Dunni.ac (19'9) for a descriptioG. 
s ...... aotMly 1:.ojilta nm ud 1475). 
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technologically umopbislicated and DOO-c:onceolrated sector• that relocated 
lbroad to KtW both bome and third couDlty marl~eu. thus tbe aucial 
dilterence in trade orooensllies•. 
After a long period oC a>ntracting imporls as proport.ioo ol GDP and 
uporl Sllgnatioo. manUCact.ured imporls and exports began to grov by I.be 
late sillies aod, after tbe oil sbocts. one observes an uncommon a>mbination 
ol a furlber deepening ol import subslllullon aa::ompanied by a sound eiport 
perform.ance in I.be same sectors in which im.porl substitution was taking 
placel. lt is also signifu:ant thal lbere were im.porlllll improvements in 
a>mpetiliveness and outward orientatlon in several established sec:tors not 
bead'"auia& from aovernment locleoUves. Many elements other than Ulose 
ad.i.ag through MNCs, acted to produce lbis notable change in the 
a>mpetiliveness ol Brazilian eiports, as discussed at length in the next 
sec:Uoa. Nevertheless. its is apt to emphasize anyhow that, as rar as foreign 
r.rms are a>aeeroed. vbat seems IO have ocucred io Brazil is that, after I.be 
t.be formative years d Bnzilian .industrialization, a stable ownership 
sttuclure was established in which f orejgn rums were leaders in several 
1edmalogically sophisticated domestic oligopolies, and Brazil's comparative 
adVaotage in these sec:lU's changed with lbe changing •outward cr.ientation• 
d t.be BtaziliaD parties d these f"lrms. Thus, lbe roots of the growing 
cnmparalive advantaae which accompanied the ·maturation· of these oow 
dynamic foreign owoed eJpar1erS in Brazil may lie in the global 
deYeJopmeots afTec\iog I.be trade orjentation of MNCs as a worJdWide 
pbl!Oomeaoa. outlined above. Indeed I.be extent oC intra-firm trade in this 
technologically intensive sectors is disproporliooally high as compared to 
that ol ltadiliooal sectorsJ. When spec:if'ic c:baracterislks ot tbe process ot FDI 
penetration io Brazilian industry are tateo iDJD aa:ouru.. there are grounds 
for believing lhal lbe iorluetice ol these general trends . upon tbe eiporl 
propensities ot foreign firms might have been st.roogty reinrorced by the 
usual proceS$Cs ol learning aod dynamic efl'"tciency gains operating in 
already establisbed subsidiarieS. 
• for a suncy or .Jala,Desc FDJ ia Bnzil see Osawa ct al. U976). 
2 Sec fruco (1'8&). 
5Scc BdJciDer U.avUDe (1979). 
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The end of the eighties witnessed 1 1rowina mocern wi1h the emting 
trade mime. and as 1 resooose to this a sweeoina reform was launched in 
March t 990 by lhe newly elected Collor government Many nev issues were 
raised in the debate vbic:h preceded the rerorms. and some other are sun IO 
be addressed in the near ruture. Section 2.1 below reviews the tey etemenu 
cl the nev envlroomeal wi1hin vbidl lbe 1990 rerorm. disc:USsed ID sec:tioD 
2.2. bas been enforced.. · Section 2.3 discvsses amceptuaJ and practica.I 
pniblems in tbe design and impJemen\ation of the trade policy reform. It is 
divided iD101.bree sub-seclians. Tbe r.irst describes and evaluates the •style· 
fl tbe reform. addressing Issues lite vbe1.ber 10 liberalize ID one shot or 
.,..dually (and. in this cue. in what span cl time), \be inherent sectoral 
biases iD the elimination d QRs and their replacement by tarifJ's and lbe 
natured tarifT reforms to be Jmplemetlted. The seco.nd subsection deals with 
tbe crucial issue d coordination between trade liberaliZalion and 
--=roecoaomic stabilization. Tbe last describes and evaluates the Htent d. 
selectivity, or sectoral discrimination, embodied in the reform. Tbe last 
section discusses recent trends in FDl and the themes to be addressed in an 
uodatina of the regulatory environment attectin& FDl in Brazil 
Z.U9ewiawsla~nrera 
The dismal economic performance ol tbe eighties, desaibed In leCtioos 
t.t and t.2, bas bred a reeling that Brull is tagging .behind the more 
dynamic semi-Industrial developing countries In lerms d Investment 
growth. wbicb is likely lo damage medium run prospects d .arowtb and 
rec:bnololic:al uDdalln&. Altbou&ht this ooor record is seen as a result d 
macroecooomic disequilibria related to .the adjustment lo the sbocts d the 
early eighties, there bas been 1 growing perception that the trade and 
industrial policy rramewort bas bea>me detrimenlal lo the aualnment d 
dynamic etrlciency and that this handicap is more serious now tban ever 
before. 
The reasons ror this ina'eased awareness ol dynamic. effac:iency 
o:JDSidetatioos are manirold. However, three d them should be singled oul 
Tbe rm is the lnnuence, · in the normative analysis d trade and 
industrialization, d tbe arawin1 number d theorelicaJ contributions 
emphasising tbe importaDce d fldOrt sucb as JeanUna and economies d 
scale as the basis for c:ompara\iYe advantage in manuf'IC\uring. The second 
reason Js hiSl«icll, as lbe perceiVecl deVelopment dlaDenaes bave dermiteJy 
manged. As Brazilian industry arew and matured, tile meanmi d 
·mdUSU'ialization-became quite different from wbat it wu in tbe heyday d 
IS and so did lbe nature d the quesUons asted about Sltategjc c:boices 
l'ellfdiD2 indUSUilllZllkm. Tbe OOliC)' problem today is DO Jonaer bow 10 
save fueian nmnae by protectjDg lbe establisbmeot d industries 10 
produce for tbe domestic m1rtet at not 100 UDreuonabJy Jarae COS\ 
differentials relative to world prices in lbe not too distant future. Tbe great 
mllleDae today is boW to reform tbe ooUcv framewort eneostveJy discussed 
.iD Pm1 One - built 10 answer lbe fcrmer problem - so as to overcome its 
d»vious .inadequacies to generate tile managerial dynamism required to 
meet the dtaJJenges posed by the worJd·s fast changing 1edmologicaJ trends 
and tbe amtinuous need d e1pon uParading by middle-income 
manuf.ctured e1porters. 
1.ul but not least. the need to overcome the macroeconomic 
ooostnints on growth inaeased the c:moern 'With the attainment d efficient 
ladustriatil.alion.. There is a arowina amensus lbal the task or restoring 
sustained growth .raer the palnrul CIOllltlc:tioo or Investment levels in the 
t 910s requires. u argued la Parl One, urting a poeenlial rorelgn eichange 
mnstraint imposed by the debt burden. restoring domeslic savings rrom its 
very depressed levels, and redressing government ranancial balance. 
However. this should be achieved In I ClODlelt or rising demands rot grea~ 
distribuliw equity and the provision or social overhead services given 
Brazil's dismal social indicators. Now. tbe only way lo simultaneously lift tbe 
foreign eic:bange and savings constraints on arowtb. and allow a rapid and 
sustained rise In real W1ges and or government coasumplion eipendilures 
on social services is to lm:reue productivity arovtb. u il would prevent 
both the erosion d. manuractured etports competitiveness IS well as the 
shin in income distribution towards waes and a consequent ran in the 
savings ratio•. 
Tbae imperaliws d. llllCl'OeCIOGOmic policy hid two cmcrete bearings 
oo the debate on tnde and industrial policy in lk'aziL Oil the one band, ·U 
mentioned above, they placed tbe concern wilb eCrlCieocy c:onsideral,ions al 
the eenk'e d the stage. On the other', the imperative d restoring public 
sector rmanciat equilibrium and raising social eipenditures sharpened 
political percept.ions or the opporlullily costs involved in allocating public 
money and or tbe vast netvott or rent creating government regulation 
reviewed in Part One. This made quite explicit the very high msts (and tbe 
very uncertain public benerdS) d the large subsidies and, especially, lai 
Hpenditures, associaled with traditional industrial and erporl promotion 
polic:ies IS well as the attocaliw distortions related IO the operation. d. public 
ent«prises. This stow move d the opinion or local elites towards 
deregulation - especially in the sphere or trade and industrial policy - was 
also undoubtedly reinrorced by the almost permanent pressure Crom some 
OBD governments and mutlitaterat orgallif.alioas Oil Brazilian public 
autbm'ilia Cot trade tiberaliDtioD. and industrial policy deregulation and, 
eventually. led to the announcement d. the sweeping reform d. the 
regulatory rramewort by the nevty elected r.ollor gavenameaL 
The dissatisflClion with the trade and industrial. policy framework 
bad. however, not led lo a consensus as far u the precise nat.ure d. policy 
reforms are c:oooerned. In rac:a. in the debate aoina on ror some time berore 
the March l 990's measures. there wer pro(und divisions ol opinion on at 
least three tey issues direcdy related to lbe relorm ol lbe trade and 
industrial policy regime. F"arst.. lbe complerity and disa'etionary cbantctef ol 
the eiisting regulatory environment afl'ectina trade and industrial policies 
have been olten aitic:irJed by those ravouring a less personal and martet 
based relalioaship between I.be bureauaacy and lbe private sedOr. 
However, the weight ol opposing views, particularly within I.be bureaucracy, 
is very coo.sidetable to judge rrom lbe ambitious rerorms auempted through 
the 1988 "New Industrial Policy. menliooed in sectioG t.3. 
Anolber tey po(icy princ:iple on vbk:b. COOU'ISUna Views were olten 
round relates to lbe issue ol ·automaticitY- ol incentives, i. e. incentives 
regulated omy by disc:ritionarily defined rules ol access to lbe bener11 but 
mg lied to performance requiremelllS. Tbe position ol business association.I 
is tbat ·automalie inceo.lives aiven to certain activities issues unambiguous 
signals to investors and reduces lbe scope ol. aovernment interference. 
Critics, ot oourse, have araued that incenlives wilbout perrormanee 
requirements can be pure waste, a serious cooc:ern iii limes ol r1SCal crisis, 
especially as businesses pressures over I.be years led lO I.be genentlir.alion ol 
risc:at incentives. thus magnirying its rlSClt costs. Heavy conditionality on 
incentives is ravoured by those mnc:eraed vith a more c:aref'ul alloallion ol 
public money and regulation. though it amounts lO a beaviler use ol credit 
incentives. which are certainly oot rree ot ideossi.na'lsies in lbe project 
approval procedures ol of'rldal credit institutions•. 
A third key point ol. dissent is lbe ertent ol. market discipline domestic 
rarms should be subject to. On lbe one band, criticism are levelled on the 
non-competitive nature ol market structures and lbe loss i1 represents in 
lefm.s ol inducements .towards technolo8k:al dynamism. On the otber. lbe 
very contrary point ot View is derended on grounds that rldorS as siu and 
concentration are signirk:ant determinants ol a>mpetitiveness, along lines 
erplained in sec:lioo t.4. and on grounds lbat national rarms sboUld be 
proleded and estimulated, a point ol view that assumed very. specific 
contours during lbe l 988 discussion 'flil1lin lbe Comtitulional Assembly, on 
lbe issue ol ailefia ravouring national rarms in public sector procuremenl 
Tbne issues were ell a-ucial importance in 1baping lbe ·1tyte• ell trade 
policy reform the new government would favour. These issues were 
di.sawed in the 1919 elecloral campaign lo the cooleil ell lbe more general 
debate on lbe relatiom between governmeDl and lbe private sector. 
Corporatist and iatetvenctionist posi1ions were openly defended by lhe 
orlhodo1 left. and less openly by .ome business interests, while liberal 
posilions. dlou&b lo quite general terms. were c:bampiooed bolh by social 
democrats and by lbe dark horse independent candidate Fernando Collor, tbe 
eveDLUal winner ell lbe election. The 1990 reform. discussed in tbe ne1t 
scctioa. reveal specirlC cbokes u regards the issues discussed above. 
Tbe sweepin& rerorm ol tbe Brazilian trade policy rerorm started in 
March t 990 bas to be underslood in the conte1t ell the wider changes 
c:oncurrenUy introduced in the traditional principles, objectives and · 
instruments ol industrial policy, rl. which it is a aucial part The core ot UUs 
new industrial policy is the shift ell emphasis to productivity growth as lbe 
prime objective ol policy. The ralioaale for such shift ell emphasis. as 
menlioned in the last section. was the need to garantee macroeconomic 
Q)Q.Sistency between the strategic objective ell real wage inaeases and lhe 
Q)Q.StraiDls on sustainable long term growth. This, as the fJrst governmeDl 
document oulliniog tbe reforms state. ·requires the radical reform ol the 
scope and ol the tradiliooal instruments ol the c:ouo.try·s industrial policy in 
which the c:oocern wilh promoting efficiency gains was. at most secondary _ 
To overa>me I.bis deff°ldeocy requires defaning a new style ol industrial 
policy geared atstimulat.ing competition as the rule ol the game and tbe 
quesl (or competitiveness as the prime eDlrepreneurial objective"•. 
To fulfill these objectives. the new industrial policy would a>ntemplate 
t'WO sets ol dirtereDl but complementary objectives and instruments. On lbe 
oae band, a ·competition policy. a-eating ·stable and transparent rules ror 
industrial a>mpetilion· and chiefly based on import liberalization and tbe 
eoad.alenl ot an effective aDli-trust policy for the the oon-tradable seclOrS, 
I~• --.&vol a• G, Mtclidia Prov•ria a• I~. Muell. 1', 1990. 
apparenUy subscribing the idea dial martet dilc:iptine lbould be taken u 
the basic inducemenl d ledmologic:al efforts. On the Olher. • 
"ex>mpelll1veness policy". wbidl would define •a set d lmlt'Uments desllaed 
to support the growth d competitiveness d national nrms·. This would be 
lmptemeated tbrouab two sets ot measures. The rnt. vo0ld consist oa 1 
thorough revision d the current awe d rueat and credit. iacelllivn ro 
industrial produelioa. investment and esporU. 'Wilb 1 Yiew to aarroving 
them down to 1 few selective hloentms to investment Tbe other. wutd 
eomentrate on auac:ting martet rauures inbibitina tedmologal errons. 
through the provisiDa ot rlSCll subsidies or rist sbariag ia rmandag d I & D 
profecls. and aealiag posWve eiternalilles 1brougb llllSSlve e1pendll.ures In 
tecbnic:al training. 1n both cases. perCormance requirements should be 
enforced. 
The implementation ot trade Ubentizalioa vu maceived to tate p~ 
ID a phased wy, followina a rather cmventlonat palb. Fnt. 1 ralionaliratioo 
ot tbe import regime would tate place. whereby most "'special regimes· 
would be abolished. Then, the actual llbentizalioa process would belin viUl 
the abolilioa ot QRs and its replacement by tariff I. conoeived to be "the only 
iastrum.em at im.porl policy"'•. and subsequenUy , tariffs would be 
progressively brougbl dmra.. 
The r1rst slep in tbis sequence WU llllde IClelber wilb tbe Wit array 
d measures issued in tbe rcrst day after the new pre.sidenrs inauguration. 
llOStly aimed at inflation Cighling, commooty tnon ill Brlzil u tbe Collar 
Plan. 1t proposed tbe end d some· import duty eiemplioas under special 
regimes (lbose wi1bin iavestmenl PfOll'lllDS - group Ill ill Table 3 above -
importt cl stale enler'prises and by the broadc:ul and movie industry). a cul 
in surtues on frei&bl revenues earmarked to nuance sbiOoer's ourdlases 
from Brazilian shipyards and investments lD Brtzilian ports, the nuwration 
ot the dea'ee authorizing the rormation ot new e1port prooessiag r.ones 
(betides the eiistiag Manaois free 1.one). and the abolition ot the list d 
forbidden imoons2. established by CACEX and known as Aaero C 
'Mmmttioda£coaoaia(l91JO). 
2 Aldulu1h the prnious ioverameat htld .. pa redociq the iteu on the list uadtt US 
pnssun, Ille list still coapn.t over one t11ome11d am out or the 13.,.., ia the 
lnziliul tariR' tchedu1e. 
Allbougb regional and sectoral lobbies aucceded in mating Coagreu IO 
dteo lbe decisi.oll oo eiporl pcocesslag maes and oo subsidies to shippers 
and abipbuilden. lbe rest wu carried out quile rapidly. Tbe abOIJ.l10G al lbe 
Allf!ID C was in effec:l in May. wbeo new - and high - tariffs were creal.ed 
(or lbe previously probibiled prodlKU. ID July. lbe loag-ltaDdiog 
quaolitaliw CIODltOb adminisleted by CACEX were rela1ed. u &..e 
aovernmelll aDDOUm:ed UW lbe issuam:e al import Umme1 by CACEl would 
bea>me automalic. SborUy after. lbe rmam:iag requiremelllS were etiminal.ed 
and lmporlalll def'milioos were made regarding lbe eJJelll and liming al lbe 
r..a.c ra11 in laritts. 11 vu decided &bat a new miff would be put in rorce al 
I.be be&iDDiD& al l 99 l. 1a&elber willl advam:e aolirk:llioo al lbe pallerD al 
ran up to 1994'. vben larilT1 would average 201 vii.bin a raoge Crom r.ero to 
a ma1i1Dum al 401. Moreover. in lbe same brealb. lbe goveromelll 
aoaoum:ed lbe begiooiag ol lbe revisioo. ol lbe •martel merve· policy ror 
-aorormalit:s &Gods·. wbich wu evelllually carried out by lbe end al lbe year. 
ll was agreed vii.bin lbe mtUN (The National C.OUncil ol lntorauatics and 
AutomatioG) tbal lbe open-ended spedtum ol ~informatics aoods· was 
reduced to a lisl ol C prodUClS whose imports will continue ao be probibiled 
UDli1 lbe eipiry al lbe lnCormalics Law in 1992. with lbe proviso lhal lbe 
domestic price ol any ol these prodUClS shall not eiceed 2.5 limes ils 
inlernaliooal price. 
The new laritt sC:bedule, with lbe projected yearly varialiom ualil 
1994'. wu aDDOUm:ed oo ,January 111. 1991 ao be in rorce in February t 5UL. 
r.enerauy speat.ina. lbe melbodoloay CoUoved by lbe Tariff Commission -
nov labelled CoordeJUdoril TkDil:I de TM'ila - consisted in classifying lbe 
13.500 ilems accor'ding IO lbe following seven tariff brackets: (i) 2.ero tariR': 
producu with natural comparalive advao1a&e• (mainly primary or temi-
processed tradilioaal eiports), with natural protection (due ao high transport 
ClOSll). with oo mmpetilive domestic production and mmmodilies wilh 1o'fl 
value added; (ii) 5S rate: prodUClS vbidl already paid 51 in 1990; (ill) rates 
betveeo tos and l5s: producu using z.ero tariR' producu as lbeir main 
input (such as I.be paper and pulp or COllOD chains); Uvl 201 rate: lbe bulk ol 
~acwred prodUClS; (v) 30S tale: r&ne cbemic:als. wheat.. wheal biscuits. 
pas&a. TV sets. remnt players. video c:asseues and sound equipmelll; (vi) 351 
rate: auaos. 1ructs and IDOl.OCydes; and (vii) 401 ral.e: inCormatics goods. 
Having dassiraed the products ac:mrding IO this general rule, tile 
pattern ol ran was designed to follow a rule ol cmcentraling tbe heavier 
reductions during the tirsl two years on intermediate and capllal goods, lllus 
enhancing effective protection and eompetitiveness ol consumer goods 
sectors. The aggregate result ol lhis erercise is shown in Table 7. 
Taltle7 
The Dft' BnziliaD tariff. 1991-94 
t!JQ 1991 lffZ 
anrqe 322 Z).J Zt.Z .. ... 0 20.0 20.0 199.1 17.l 20.0 H.Z 20.0 
Sbpd!anf dtriatipg l!.6 17.4 K2 t0.7 7.9 
Soun:e: C'oo .. udori& Ttcnica• Tarifa, llilaislfrio da r.coulli&. 
ll can be seen lhal lbe new tariff rans rather gradually over time and 
pC"Otection becomes more bomoeeneous among goods. viloess tbe rau in tbe 
standard deviation of the rates. Nevertheless, ii one tates into eoa.sideralioo 
lb.at the tariff in rorce alter the 1990 round ol abolition ol QRs bad a 
muimum d 1051, \he ntent d the projected liberalization loots quite 
impressive. 
Tbe reform d the trade regime also eomprised c:banges in the 
e11ensive gamut d eiport promotion instruments. The first attack came in 
March t 990, within the Collar Plan. First. the riscat incentives conceded as 
income ta:r eiemptioos ror erport earoings, were abolished togelber with 
sewral other subsidies and tax e1penditures u part d a mmprebemive 
rLSCa.t oacta&e. Sea>od. lbe BEFlEX oroaramme was terminated but ror the 
O>l1lcacls then in rorce. 
The seeond turn c:ame in the June guidelines (JJiretrizesJ document. 
wtlen the govemment announced a new export policy. Aa:ording to tbe 
staled aims of this policy, the mainstay ol e1port inc;entives would be erport 
aedit. and while the traditional F'me1 «edit lines provided by lbe IJallOJ do 
/Jnsil were rromn. it was announced lbal a new Bruiliin Elimbant would 
be rounded under private control. However. there were non-negligible 
dirt"tcullies witb this private Elim.bank initiative. mostly derived rrom the 
1ac:t ol interest ol tbe part <i the private tinanc:ial sector in providing eiport 
finance in inlemalionally mmpetitive terllll even villl the public bac:kins ol 
ezport guarantees. Thus, to reduce the plight ol some xgments ol lbe capital 
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goods sec:lm' bard bil by the mllapse lo domestic demand toltoving the early 
stabilization measures, the BNDFS eventually stepped in creating an special 
Uoe for rllllloce cl equipment erports (Finamei). 
l.J) Pnlllems ia tile ilnia• -• iafle .. alati9• er nreras 
. ln Part One it was argued that the structure ot protection was strict 
ind c:ompte1 and the Brazilian economy was markedly underinvolved in 
international trade. Yet. the reader may easily notice that the 
implementation ot trade tiberalimtion in these conditions is likely to meet 
many problems. The rnt. discussed at length in subsection 2.3.l, is related 
to sequencing issues in light cl the peculiarities cl trade barriers in Brazil 
Ne1:t. maaoec:onomk obsladel are discussed vilb. a viev oo the dassic 
argument against trade liberalization under macroeconomic instability and 
the somevbat parado1:i.c:ll wave .cl liberalizations in Latin America in the 
late eighties. Fmally, sub-sedioft 2.3.3 c:Oa.siders the targeted nature 
Uberalizalioo vUl most likely usume during the transitional phase towards 
an open trade regime, and the implied political economy. 
2.3. l) Tnde liberali!:ation. Bw;ilian style 
ll is wry dear from the analysis ot the last section lbat the 
liberalil.alion program in Brazil was cmc:eived to be phased, though 
somewhat tentative given the uncertainlies oo the etrects cl a greater 
integration into the world industrial economy tor a country so underinvolved 
in international trade tor so many years. This gradualism is perceived in the 
besilaliom in dismantelling some key NTBs. especially lbe vut ·Delvork ol 
local coo.tent requirements practiced lbrouabout the economy, and at.so on 
the schedule cl tarirt reductions planned to be mmpleted only in 1994. 
Tbe Brarilian program loosely follows the cannonical sequence that 
starts with the removal and "tarifraalion· cl NTBs, i e. their substitution ror 
milts near tbeii •tariff-equivalent• and it is followed by a pbased reduction 
of these tariffs. A real devaluation usually accompanies this process, 
especially when laritt1 are reduced below ·equivalent• levels. ll ia indeed 
obJetYed that the real eirchaage rate depreciates signU"anlly ataer March 
1990 When ll nan In 1 level about balC or lbe one corresooodlna io the 
averqe for 198.5, and recovers UUs level in .llsy 1991. It should be noted 
that in Marc:b the RCNet"'Dment umounced the demite d tbe a-wliog peg 
system and its repJaicemeat by a (dir1y) floating ac:bange rate system. Since 
\be ccmltOI CNer fareJan e1Cba,nae traosatUons was maJJnlUled tbe noauna 
rate was acsua.lly very much controUed by the Central Rant both throuab the 
def"'mition d rules d aooen to the martet and tbroup cUrect interven\ion. In 
arty event, the government Jen dear tbat a f\11"\ber devaluation would 
naturally ObWil uneler tbe l'kla\lnl e1Cba.nae rate system Jr JmP<lf't voiumes 
i8ctease sipirantly in responte to lower import barriert. Whether real 
dewluaUons would late place. bowever. seems to depend Oil the a>minl• 
debt qreement, as tbe liberalization did not give muc:b impulse to imports, 
whic:b were also depressed by lbe recession Jn J990. 
~ lhe apparently c:oavelllioaal desip. one should DOI. loose •iahl 
of tbe peculiarities or the Brazilian system or proled.ioa.. F'1r1Uy, given the 
deoea.tralir.ed. diwrsiriecf and 8edOC' spec:ifc nature of HTBs in. Brazil i1 is 
dear lbat a sequential removal or lfTBs necessarily c:onrer 1 Largeted 
c:baractet to lhe Brazilian liberalil.ation. Indeed, the elimination or the Anero 
C tiberaliz.es mosUy consumer IJOOds. while lbe maintenance oC local matent 
requirements (oaly wilh a slight reductioo in levels practiced by BNDES'), oC 
reslrictioos oa. ·wormatics goods· and, at least initially, ot eirteroal rmandng 
requirements, kept the large Bruilian capital goods and the informatics 
industries in a qui.le protected regime. Moreover. with lbe suspension oC new 
BEFIEX conlrads an important mechanism rarms could use IO gain aa:ea to 
illlOCJ('led capital goods was eliminated. so that the· capital ROOdS and Pitts 
industry was even more proleded than berore. 
The government's unwilliagBeSS to review lhe incidence or local 
CXlllllent requirements. is a auci.al element in lbe Brat.ilian l.iberalir:atioo 
e1perimen.t. since the these requirements arrec:t most modern indus1rial 
I Loml mlllnl. ~ir'ellHIS were r&nt reduced iD Ille rmaaciai ot Ille llCqUisiaioD. or 
•..ti.aally p~ c:api.IAl soods through the TillllE prognua. ad iD Fetlruary 
1991. il ftS rurtb.er reduced to• llaiau• or601.. llole. lloftftr. dl&l a 19&8 .. ,, sUl1 iJl 
(oru ....,lislles dl.11 all ri.ras receivi.D.g uy kind or fasml subsidy ad rauaciDg rrom 
orrteial lllUlb aad iDvulftd iD pftntlleD.l procurem:nt sbould lie •b;ect to. local . 
CIOD.lltlll requireiuo.l . 
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segments. as noted in section lJ.- representing possibly more than SOI ol 
aanutac:turing outpul The prospects ol a meaniog(ul ioaeue in imporb ol 
producer &oods in such CX>Clditioas are certainly llOl brigbl, e1cept roe 
consumer &OOds. whose imports increased by 251 in 1990. Indeed, no 
inaease could be observed in imports ol intermediate goods since Marc:b. 
which may certainly be due to the recession. 
ln addition. tbere wu CX>DSiderable besilalioo In advancing reCorms In 
\be mrormalics policy, particularJy as regards import cxmtrol powers 
eiercised cm -mrormaUc:s aoocts·, mosUy"because \be main body responsible 
for lbis po!Ky, \be a>tUN, maintained iu ·sectoraJ cbamber· structure, with a 
lli&b .leYeJ d poliliza\icm d decisions, wblcb lends to min.imil.e tbe scope for 
reforms. Jt is uodear - eJcepl for political reasons - wby a list d prohibited 
aoods t:11• a cap on price clilTereotials WIS DOl simply repJaced by a tar.iff. ll 
is yet UDCerlliD wbelber wba lbe informatics Jaw is bound to eipjre, a 
meaniDgl'ul cbange would we place iD \be very restriClive BnWlian 
informatics policy pradjoed since lbe early eighties. Etpectations are \bat \be 
twernmenl will aDDOUDCe aeneraJ ruJes for infant industry protection in 
hiab tech seamenu in the future. 
This rather odd nature ol tbe Brazilian liberali1.ation oroaram - biased 
for amsumer goods and against producer goods - is complemented by an 
anli-eJP<rt attitude visible in lbe suspension of new contract.sin tbe BEFJEX 
prccram, the eliminalion ol some apart incentives and rmanc:ing 
mecbausms and \be skN speed. by the Central Bank, in reversing \be 
marted e1cbange rate appreciation observed during lhe last few months d 
\be Slrney administratiCJn. Altbougb lbe appreciation would be reversed 
some lime af\er, lbal illuSlraleS lbe Jack ol commitment wilb an aggressive 
eJport pQlky IS far IS lbe eicbange rate is ccmoerned. This orientation 
stands at variance wilb lbe recent liberalizatioo uperience ol olber Latin 
Americ:aD aiuntries, wbo very eJpJic::itly targeted e1ports liberalizing inputs 
used lberein eilber lbrougb import-to-e~port schemes or tbrougb eJport 
processing zones•. T.be sua:essruJ eiperienoe d lbe BEFIEX prqp-am, bes.ides 
lbe eiperienoe d other countries (South [orea, most not.ably), would appear 
to indicate lhll Brazilian liberalizalioD could proceed by e1tending and 
generalizing lhis program, but for reasons \bat may be related to lbe 
complez political economy oC trade rerorm in Bratit, eiporting was not 
considered a priority. 
The eitent ot the process ot 9tarimcation· or NTBs is very much 
affected by these developments. As rar as consumer goods are concerned, 
the outright prohibition vas obviously replaced by tariffs lower than •tariff 
equivalents• leading lo a meaningful erpansion. ot such imports. No major 
import surge could yet be seen. but the potential erpansioo in lhe oert years 
may be very high. For capital goods and industrial inputs the permanence or 
important NTBs places the discussion ot the redefanition ot tariff' schedules in 
a secondary place. In raa. the crucial motivation in cbaagiag tariff rates in 
these goods during 1990 had lo do with lhe perceived importance ot these. 
imports in price rormation ot a number ot industrial segments whose · 
products affect infiation rates. For many such aoods, notably in chemical 
intermediates, capital goods and also in temles, tariff rates were brought lo 
mro on an 1d-boc basis. At least until local content reauirements are 
eliminated, tariffs will bave but 1 l'unc1ion d defmig tbe costt d imports 
tbat bappen to by-pass tbe barrier created by these requirements. 
232) Irade tiberatb:ation and mac:roemnomic instability 
Another classical problem is that oC implementing a major trade 
hl>eralizatioo. program in the c:ontert or a highly inflationary eamomy, that 
is, the problem or the optimum timing between the stabi.lir.ation 11nd 
liberalization programs. Until rec:enUy, lhe consensus view on this issue 
stressed the need lo stabilise. or more generally. IO reduce macroeconomic 
instability, before launching a major trade tiberati1.atioo experiment•. The 
basic rationale underlying this prescription is rwotold. F"arst, that the 
structural adjustment costs during trade liberalir.ation vilJ be lessened by a 
higher rate or investment. roreign and domestic. which is uolit.ely IO obtain 
in the coa.terl or the contractionary demand management required by lhe 
stabilization efforL Second. that the rise in imports due ro lbe rau in ~ir 
relative price may place strains on the balance or payments leading IO an 
I See Saclts (JCJ81). 
actual or eiped.ed uchanae rate devaluaUon. wiLb negative erreca. co 
inflationary e1peaatioos. Some recent contributions have disputed dais 
traditional view by arguing Lbal. as I.he greatest asset in • stabilil.aUoo 
program is aedibility, com.m.ilment IO a major liberalil.atioo. e«ort may boost 
public confidence ill Lbe economic policy authorities and Lbus belp Lbe 
success of the program•. More disturbing IO I.he tradilicoal view is the rac:t 
Lbal. as already argued ill sub-seclioo 2.3. l, many Latin American and bigbly 
indebted countries ol oLber regions have liberalil.ed their trade regimes 
starling in the accute moments ol I.he debt crisis. 11 was noted that in most 
cases liberalization was targeted toward export industries and were 
acmmpanied by devaluatioos. but even so. iC liberalil.atioll may have a 
positive balaoc:e ol payments effect, a powerful case can be made against Lbe 
tradiliooal view. 
ln the Bruilian case, lhe government strategy was designed according 
IO uie tradilional view. While the stabilization proeram was tauncbed in lhe 
day f ollcN.ing President CoUor's innauguration in Marc::b 1990, the decisive 
pbue d \be U'ade liberalization program, as desaibed above, was scbeduled. 
for \be period 1991-9'4. The e1peclations at that time were that when tariffs 
would begin to fall \be worst p.base d the S1abiliZaOon program would 
already be over. Tbe fac.t \bat things did not bappen according to plan in the 
Slabiliza\ioD front - wj\b inflation rates Slill r.igidly stud around 201 per 
mon\b by the beginning d 199 J - and that \be government bas not made a 
ma;or revision d it js trade liberaliutic.111 timetable means \bat. .in pf'Ktiee, 
Brazil is launcbiDI a liberalizatiaD Pf"(l8fam at a lime wben a major 
Slabiltra1ioD efJort is Slill needed. In fact. a new price freei;e Sllt1ed in March 
1991, and ii is scbeduled to laSL way through \be seamd semester. This 
poses some impciunt clilT.ialJties fcir the management d eamomic policy 
wba, if not properly addressed, may generate maaoe<XIQOmic disequilibrja 
wlla will substantially inaeue the costs of \be trade liberalization 
program. 
Let us begin by analysing lhe likely impacts ol trade Uberalil.ation on 
i.of'lation ilsetr. lt is interesting ao aolice tbal trade liberalil.ation as 
conduc:led in 8ta!il bad two sequential effects on Lbe domestic pria? level 
The first happened during the first phase the program, mm.prising 
l the .-uticulabl step in this diredioe wu ude by Rodtit (1990). 
dismanUing of some ·special import regimes·, was ne<:essarily pre>-
inftationary. Indeed, as •true• protection increases. the a>st d importing is 
i.nCX'eased generating an inflationary ecrect d the same nature d an adverse 
terms of trade shock. Simulations based on models of inflation would suggest 
that a 301 inaease in •true·· (nominal) protection would increase an annual 
inflation rated, ror eremple, 5001 ro approximately 6551 and ooe d 501 ro 
33.71•. However. in spited the abolition d many special import regimes. 
some important ones have remained, lite the on-going BEFIEX contracts, 
international agreements, draw-back schemes, Manaos Free 1.one imports, air 
transportation and 1d-/Joc roodsturr imports, under which a substantial 
percentage of Brazilian imports - perbaps balr - are made. For this. reason 
the ina'ease in •true· protection is likely robe small in the rirst years. 
The relevant errect. however. is that ro be reu aloag the 
implementation d the taricr cuts ro begin in early l 991. i e. that d the rau 
in the beighl d the protection on domestic producers' mart-ups. A. naive 
understanding of this ecrect - which is quite current within government 
circles, judging from orri.cial discourse - leads to the view that liberalization 
will provide an important additional weapon to the stabilization program as 
the ratt in taricrs will erode monooolistic maf'iins enjoyed by an over-
protected industrial secror, thus imposing greater price discipline at least in 
the manuracturing sector. Although there is a lot ro say about greater price 
discipline generated by a more a>mpetitive environment in lhe long run if 
the liberalization program eventually bappens to meet is targets. it is rather 
obvious that the relevant competitive price to domestic producers depends 
not only on lhe taricr but also auciatly on the real exchange rate and, as 
argued in subsection 2.3.t. on lhe prevalence of ·market reserves· created 
by local a>ntent requirements. Besides. one has to a>nsider that ror imports 
ro have a meaningful errect on sheltered domestic markets, import 
penetration ratios in manuracturing would have to reach values much rugher 
than to ones curenUy observed - as seen in Table I - which most likely vm 
not be reasible in tbe short run 1iven balance of paymenl-' limitations. 
Thus. there is a dear ooo.flict of objectives in assigning the erchange 
rate in the a>ntext ol a liberalization cum stablilation program in an 
1 The siaulatioll is based OD. ~Is UCOUDUD.g (ot th~ dired e(!'ect or shocks OD 
inflation and their feed-bactecrects lhrough indeDlion. for details !ee f ruco (1990b). 
e<x>nomy which still faces a severe threat or erternal disequilibrium on 
account ol its heavy dependence on oil imports and high a>ntractual foreign 
debt service. While maintaining eiternal equilibrium would require 
compensating lhe errec:t.s or a Call in average tariffs by devaluing the 
e1change rate to the same eztent or the fall in the average tariff, using trade 
·. liberalizatioll as an aid ID stabllir.ation would require not allowing the 
e1cbaoge rate to fall ID tbe run e1tent or tbe fall in the average tariff. 
A second crucial problem is tbe errect. that tiberalizatioo. iC conducted 
in the mnte1t or a drastic stabllilatioo program. may have on the level or 
employmeDL A typical and dangerous policy mil in such a situation -
witnessed. for instance. in the liberalization e1periments undertaken in the 
Sou\bern Cone d Latin America during the seventies• - is that d light 
mooet11Y policies and a sharp falJ in protection d consumer goods. The 
reason is that. in the conteJt d rapidly falling barriers to consumer goods 
impcrtS, lbe high interest rates and sbortening d lending terms produced by 
the tightening d manetary policy tend to severely .inhibit investment but 
00\ OODsumption rmancing. This bas important negative short - and Jong -
run consequences on empJoymenL Jn the shorter run. by stimulating fast 
imJl(f"t penetration it inaeases the adjustment oosts in the oonsumer goods 
industries. In t.be Jonger run, high interest rates .inhibit investment - thus 
delaying the needed structural adjustment towards comparatively 
advantaged industries - and eJpend.iture divers.ion towards consumer goods 
inhibits domestic private savings - thus reducing potential output and 
empJayment. 
Last but not least there i.s the potential effect or trade liberalization on 
balance ol payments equilibrium. which has been the traditional argument 
Cor protectionist import substilution policies and against liberalization 
ei:periments in BcatiL The reasons here are, or course, related to fears or an 
import surge caused by the fall in the final price or importables relative to 
a>mpetitive domestic production. resulting from the fall in the average tariff 
on. Whet.her these rears are jusliCied is, however. an empirical question.. 
&:ooometric estimates or import equations Cor Brazil with significant 
I See firendl-llavis &. 'Vial (199C)) [or & lucid account of the Chilean experience. 
mefracients ror the relative price term• are anilabte only for inlermediate 
and capital goods which are2 responsible ror the bulk of manufactured 
imporlSS and. thus. their reaction is very Important to assess the early 
response in terms of the demand for roriegn eicbange a>ming rrom the rise 
in imports. Moreover. as the emciency enhancina motivation · ror 
liberatiz:atioo. lend lo ravour liberalization of inputs. an import surge or 
c:oosumer goods which lbrealened eiternal equilibrium is likely to be 
O>Unlefaded by temporary prohibitive surcharges. 
The typical elasticities ror the intermediate and capital goods sectors 
are of the order of t.O ror the inrome term. 0.5 ror the relative price term ror 
both secrors. and around 2.0 and 3.0. resoeettvety. ror capacity ulllizaUon. 
Thus even if one allows that the widespread use of administrative restrainlS 
on trade in the past may resuU in some underestimation of the· price 
elasticities in these ecionometric erercises,. the r11ures show that the impact 
of a ran in the avegare tarilrs or around «Js to about 20s. as mo.templa1ed 
in Brazil, will result in 1 rise in the volume of imports of slightly more than 
71. This r11ure does llOl loot terribly large when a>mpared lo the possible 
influence of paUerns of fast recovery in output growth. given the relevant 
elasticities. The aucial policy instrument to a>Untervail the threat or 
erternal disequilibrium during the liberalization program is. however, the 
ercbange rate. In fact, an oUseUing real devaluation of just 1'4.3S4 is all that 
is needed to mmplelely neutralize the impact on import volumes or an 
average tarilr rail rrom 401to20s. as proposed in the Brazilian program. 
On the other ertreme, the balance or payments amcerns raised by 
liberalization may be enhanced if one considers that. with the dismantelling 
• See fClr eseaJl)e Abreu U987l. ne staadarcl specjficatiOJI of import (euJudin& oil and 
Yhc:al) equations .is oflbe form: 
Jo& M ·a . Joa Y • b. 101 RP• c . log U 
Yht:re Y sm.cb for domestic deaaad. RP for rcla&ive .Prices betwet:11 im_portables and 
clraaeslic productiOJI • &iYen by lbe pruclud (e(r).(M)J . wberc e(r) mnds for I.be n:aJ 
ac.bange nit and l for lbe average latiff naie - and U for capacity utilization. 
2 EcoDCllM:\ric tst.i•tles for consuw a004k U.pol1S lft not serjously considered gjven 
long Sl&Ddin& non-price .restrictioAs, such as Maioislnlrle canU'Ols and ouUig.bl 
pra.bihitions. •.bic.b are difficuh IO .Picture iA Sl&tislical 1.erms. 
5 In I.be lYdYe monlbs belYeea micl--1989andaid-1990 I.bey accounl.ed for 831. or IOta.I 
importsezdvdiJlg ail andY.bc:al. 
4 to aeutnlia the run erted. or the fall in larifts on relative prices ud thuS on import 
volumes - the nctwtp rare bas ID lie deftlued by ditCr)/e(r) - dl/(M) so tbat 
dPRIPR.0. See roota.ote z in the previous page. 
of non-border QRs (local content requiremenll), Brazil would tend IO 
approach levels of import penetration similar to those observed in countries 
of a mmparable level of development such u, ror eiampte, Merla> and 
Turkey. ln these two cases, one should e1pect manufactured imports to be 
appro1imately ina'eased by a factor of 3 and a factor of 5. respectively, most 
litety creating serious balance of payments mn.straiots if an e1port surge is 
not simultaneously oroduced•. 
The discussion above indicates that the implementation of a 
liberalization program may create a conClict in the assignment of bolb long 
rerm interest rates and lhe ercbange rate. The reduction of structural 
adjustment msts will require usigning these instruments to lhe objectives of 
trade tiberatitation. Thus, on the one band, it will be important to decouple 
the long lerm interest rate to the upward pressures placed upon the short 
end ol the term structure of interest rates by tight monetary policies. This is 
not dimcult as rar as the present institutional arraD1ements in Brarll wort.. 
as tong lerm tending is mostly provided by public development bants. 
notably BNDES, whose rundi.ng comes Crom special sources largely 
independent rrom conditions prevailing in private capital markets. The 
enlargement of the basis ror industrial rmanci.ng without tying more public 
or publicly garanteed funds will, however, depend on criative financial 
engineering and, above all, tasting suc:eess on the stabililation front. 
On the other band, the authorities will have to chose to allocate the 
e1cba112e rate to the objectives of trade oolicY. allowint some real 
devaluation both to compensate ror the toss in competitiveness of producers 
or import a>mpeting goods due lO the planned fall in protection IS well IS 
boosting etport performance to avoid balance or payments stringencies to 
appear. or course, the timing and ettent of such devaluations will perforce 
be subject to constraints imposed by the stabilil.ation program. 
I for details see Franco 0990b. p. 17). 
2.3.3) Track ljberalitation and induskial tarutiot. 
F"mally, it remains lo discuss lo what ertent the new Brazilian lrade 
regime will retain elements ol induskial targeting• which r11ure so 
prominently in the design and administration ol import proteclioo over the 
past decades. To put this question in perspective one bas to bear in mind 
lb.at, as described above, the trade liberalization program is part ol a broader 
reform ol trade and industrial policies which bas as a prime objeclive lo 
coordinate the use ol all - border and non-border - policy instrumenh 
affec:ting the sectoral mmposlion ol manufacturing investmenl Thus, 
according to the stated aims ol the authorities. tile saructure or protedion lo 
be designed as a partial inslrumenl in induskial targeting. Its selectivity will 
thus rertec:t the ·strategic choices· dertned in the broader design ol induslrial 
policy. 
Unfortunately. at the lime ol writin&. the government had not yet 
defined these strategic choices. Rovever. in the basic guidelines document 
(Diretrizes Cerais> published in June 1990. il was announced that targeted 
sectors would ran into one ol each ol lhe roUowiaa two groups. The r1rst were 
segmenl.S ol high tech induslries - informatics, rme chemicals. precision . 
mechanics, new materials and biotechnology - to be selected ror infant 
industry promotion oo a traditional import substitution basis. The second sel 
ol industries was an undefined group ol segmenlS wbicb was erpecced to 
attain inlernational mmpetitiveness t.broUgb reslructuri.ng. 
Broad as they are. these guidelines quite clearly suggest lb.at high 
trade barriers viii continue to be overUy used as a policy instrumenl ror 
industrial targeting in the rarmer, ·new industries·. group. Indeed, the 
document puts forward quite e1pliciling lb.at the ma1imum 401 tariff target 
ror t 99'4 will not be binding ror these sectors, as price diff erentiats between 
domestic product.sand mmpetiog imports are much larger. This policy.cboice 
merits some mmments. A rnt point to note is the ract that within this group 
there are several inputs - such as automation inslruments. mmputers. 
mmpu~-aided machinery and so on - whose diffusion should clearly be 
stimulated. However. the higher domestic prices produced by import 
I Industrial lllrptiai is derte.ed here OD the lines or In11ma.n (1917). - the errort to 
duaage the alloc&tiDe. or illvesbWDl aaoq iAdusaries • as ID rawar iadus&ries ia. 
Yhi~h the IMrbt is believed to underinvesl. ' 
proledion. besides ma-easing producers' surplus, reduces the level ol 
dem1nd relatively lO 1 rreer trade regime. Thus, in this case, the optimum 
policy would be lo provide 1 direct subidy lO producers. inStead or erecting 
high barriers lo trade. A second point is that. ror a country so poorly 
endowed with the basic elements for the fast attainment ol capability in 
advanced tedmologies, il is very risky lO embark upon targeted policies in 
sedOrS "1lere learning curves in the innoVating centres are still very steep 
and product life cycles very short due lo technological cbsolesceoce. In these 
cues. chances are that either domestic producers vill never reach 
inlecnalional cost standards or reach them loo near the date in which 
pruductioa is disconlinued in the innoValin& cenrre. so as ro mate unlikely 
the ruUiltment ol the Mill-Bastabte criteria for infant industry promotion•. 
In the second set or industries - i e. those -an need or restructuli1qf 
lo attain competitiveness - tariff protec:tioll vill be given, as defined in the 
trade Uberali1.ation sdledute. but no meD.lion was made or disman1ellin& local 
content requirements sheltering many such sectors. Jn this case, it will fall to 
tbe Olber IMOUnced mstruments or mdustriaJ policy - sucb as subsidised 
1ana-ierm creel.it, government procurement and so on - to try and inaease 
tbe leYeJ d investment iD each taraeted industry. However. ttven Braz.ifs 
inslitut.ional realities it is very diJTicult to believe that a-eating sectoral loci 
for tbe administration ti cliscretionary instruments d policy will not lead to 
tbe maintenance d non-b<rder measures to cliscriminate against imports in 
tbe alloCation or ineenlives. such as the current practice wicb muimum 
impcrt amtent requirements on a more « Jess aeneraJized fashion. This may 
be even wonened by tbe government's inteotion, as stated in the June 
guidelines. d enforcing a system d ·consensual pJannmg· through what was 
called GEPS ( lin/ptls Elt!Clllivtlr de Milici .feltrW>. an OU\ll'OWD or the past 
eipefience ti sectoral cbambers under tbe 1988 dea'ee. This is a dangerous 
deYelopment as far as the idea ti having a Jess personal and market based 
rela\iansbip between the government and the private sector is cxmcemed, 
I tile 'Mill- Bmtable coadilioa rec[Uires tUl lhe present n.lue of losses incurred by 
pr"OCllCtillg. or subsiifiziq. aa "ia.faal ia.dustry. be at teat equal to the discounted Vlllue 
or pills produced after lhe iafaal malores aad eom.peliliven91S is reAChed. For aa 
ellllllonlion or lhis usu.eats Yilh reference ID lhe 8C'llziliaa npereo.c:ie. see Frilsch & 
Franeo (t9"c). 
and denotes the bureauaacy' resistence or deregulation in trade mnd 
industrial policy mating. 
Z.4-..C.at tna .. ia nt -· Ille npa.r.ry r,...,,.rt 
Given the important contribution POI has been providing in enriching 
the lints between Brazil and the world industrial economy discussed in Part 
One. the prospects or FDI in the t 990s should be seen as an imporllnt 
element in the redefinition or trade and industrial policy instruments. In this 
a>nnec:tion two issues should be addressed. On the one hand, it should be 
noted that• deteriorating macroea:momic ·climate• ror investment ac:tivity 
in general lbrougb the elglltles bas llOl mntribuled IO a areater presence or 
FDI in 8raziL On the other, the proli[eration or new rorms or FDI and the 
ina'easing role played by transactions with intangible assets within the FDl · 
process poses new challenges IO the regulatory rramewort afftecting F'DI in . 
Bralil 
As regards the effects or maaoecoaomic instability, it may be seen in 
Table I that the notable fall in FDI innows after 1982 can be pen:»ived not 
only in net inflows and reinvestment but also in the ina'ease in dividends 
and repatriations. This was induced by the a>njulldion or a sharp recession. 
the uncertainty prevailing during the acute moments or the debt crisis and 
the acceleration or inflatiOCL The economy would experieGCe a teCOYerY in 
the second semester or t 98'4 IO last uDlil the collapse ot the Cruzado Plan 
late in 1986. but FDI nows would not reuin ore 1982 levels. The observed 
ina'eatie in fDJ flows after J 987 js somew.bat surprjsmg, and the more so 
aiYeD tbe uncertainties tbat surt'OUftded tbe treatment to be given to foreign 
capital m tbe new Brazilian Constitution then being voted. Most or these 
unoertaint.ies bad d.isapeared by 1.be end d 1987, but tbe very- significant 
reuNer/ fl FDf in 1988 was almost entirely due to debt-to.eqwty 
caovenions following tbe more liberal regime enforced in \bis year: wbi.!e 
ordioary fDJ (not 1.broug)J coilversions) and reinvestments maintained levels 
mmparabJe to 1.be previous years. conversions rose to aver USS 2.0 billions 
in 1918 .. ll bas been also Mled lbal tbe opportunity IO effect debt 
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c:oayusioas may have induced subsLanlial ina'euet in dividends payment.s 
and repatriations ooly lO reenter lhe country lbrougb c:oaversioas•. A· 
signif l.Clnl dea'ease is observed during 1989 after Ule suspension oC 
cooversioos. wbidl rein!orc:ed lhe impression lhat Lbey may noL have been 
imporlanl lO induce /res/J investment decisions, the sharp increase in FDI in 
1988 being e1plained by investments postponed in the expectation oC a more 
favourable legislatioo wtllcll was also eipeaed not lO last very kMI&. 
Table I 
bired.ianstmcat. reia~lll&llllcliYiilellUb. 1911-198& 
lUSSMillml 
liZl:IZ" IS3:1Z" •• 12H IS' (I) GICm INFLOWS 1.682 991 Z.73Z IJll 6H 
"" ...... 9.5 u a.a u 1.4 (2) 1HIU DtJl1' a>NYf.ISIOtC JJO 466 2.,09) 930 228 
'l., ........ u 47.1 76.7 61..S S7.I 
(S) lfJJA111ATIOICS 176 324 Z90 6-r,) 28) 
'l ..... llSt. I.I J.2 u 1.0 II.&. 
(.0 DIYIDfJmS 41112 974 1.539 2 • .COO a.L 
'll.rl.lllSt' 1.9 S.7 :u 7.0 
(S) • (I) - (2) - (S) - (4) ~ -m -J.IC}2 -UC 
(6) af.:um:mmm aa1 555 714 .... .... 
'llMala.t' 5.1 2.1 2.S 
m mIM. EH m· l~I 1.m -a11 m 
' fflr die iinll aiDe ....a. • uaUll .._. $Duree: AU,lll& Ir• Cort• Ila 
..... (1986). Oripaal fipnls ,,. ... CmuaJ de .. ii ..... Gaiita MerQalil. 
Tbe wu-Senina outlook for FDI iD Brazil is relued to lbe overall 
investment climate in tbe country lbat is now plagued by maaoeconomic 
instability. ft is 1.0lally unreallistic to eJpec:t FDJ to regain past levels without 
rebuilding the basic CODditioos necessary fat. a sustained rea:Nery, lbat is, to 
resolve tbe buge budgetary dilT.icuJties, to acbieve a drastic reducl.ion iD 
inflaliaD - iD sum to ·put lbe bouse in atder-. .Basic:ally. tbe factors currenlly 
amstraining FDI are lbe very same tbal CODstrain capital formation in 
geoeraf. 
lD parallel. a>mplaints bas been ina'easiogly wioed regardiog &be 
regulatory regime govero.iog FDl. "11idl bas always been Liken as eiemplary 
I 'Difle111aODS ill disalullls obsenal>le ill Ille secoadary eubt Cot llnszi.liaa clebt Md 
· ... ,....by tbe 1lnziliq «Atlllral lllUlt ill Creeia& domestic curreacy c:ouaterpatU or 
S'ftf •pena&.iou ctaam swral oppor1Uailics Cot' prvfl&able aniln&c leadiai IO a 
blosi>aa&a, or~..., operatioas ia tbe lale t980s. 
regarding operation of foreign subsidiaries in manuracturing. According lo 
the erisling rules. dividends can only be remiled al the otricial ercbange rare 
without progressive ta1ation iC below 121 or regislered capital YeL. the 
Central Bant allows the registration or roreign capital only to the proportion 
of the faxed investment in goods, machines and buildings. Intangible assets 
cannot be regislered, wbic:h artiC-.ciaUy reduces the base upon vb.idl 
dividends can be remited in businesses ror wbl.ch such assets are important•. 
These sec:tors are very obviously penalir.ed lbe con.sequence of which is 
creating a disincentive for FDl in such sectors, most notably services and 
high tecbnology industries. lo parallel 8ra%il adopts a very restrictive and 
highly discretionary stance lOWards tedulolo&Y transrer a>ntracts. limiUa& 
the possibilities of technological associations and franchising rela~hips lo 
the very minimum. ln consequence, the country's erpenditures in foreign 
technology are maintained in very reduced levels: around USS t 50 million . 
in 1988. one lenlh of the Korean figure Wilen normalir.ed by GDP2. 
As a result or this regime, FDl presence in services, ror eHmpte, i.s · 
significantly inferior lo what is generally observed internationally. FDl in 
services have represenled a proportion between 531 and 571 or outward 
'f'Dl nows Crom the US, the UK and Japan in 1931-35. and these years inward 
FlJl flows in services in Brazil have been only 13.41 or IOtal infloWs3. Tbe 
increasing share or services in global FDI possibly renects the importance or 
information ledlllologies and assoc:ialed intangible assets involved in 
operations or inlernalional businesses. Tbe raa lhal. in the rirsl batr or the 
1930s, inward FDl in services in Brar.ii responded lo a much smaller 
proportion or lotal inflows than the corresponding proportion or outward 
nows or major inveslor muntries does indicale an inadequacy or lbe 
Brazilian ~ulalory re&ime. to wb.idl we may add a number or sectorial 
restrictions on foreign owned firms in services' activities, that may bea>me 
serious as intangible assets Corm the bu1Jc or assets transferable to foreign 
locations lhrough FDl and ·new forms· or relation.ship between MNCs and 
host muntries - joint ventures. licensill&. ledulicat assistence, marketing 
t 'Despite some e1:ceptions gnutled 011114 #A« basis. For delailssee Fraoco (t99(1c). 
2See Fraoco (199(1c). fiote. in addition. UWthe Bl'llliliaa st•tisticsoft~ services 
as roreicn capital in holding companies. ao maUer if they control uauracturinc 
buslaenes. are registered a in ·raaucial services·. 
S Sl.uvaat &. ZilllllJ (ICU. p. 27) ud &am Centrsl do Bnlzil. 
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agreements. etc. - lend to predominate. Indeed, with a rapidly moving 
technological frontier, and with 10 inaeasingly internationalized world, 
there sboUld be an ioaea.sed role for ·new forms· under wllidl one could 
legitimately e1pect. according to Dunning (t9&2. p. 370), -mternational business 
to flourish llhoughl its character will change and its struelure will become a 
lot more diversified. The integrated MNE should remain a dominant force in 
led:ulolDgy and information inlensive industries. but probably will not be the 
typical foreign investor d. the future:• 
During the 1950s,. the typical Rymerian period d. FDl, Brazil ocrered a 
landmart eiample d. a regulatory regime in line d. international ttends to 
the Cllenl that investment in toods (machines) was allowed (still isl. 
permitiog whole factories to be transplanted and added to the firm's 
operational assets without any foreign eicbange transaction, and dividends 
a>Uld be remiled on the basis d. the presumed valued. physical capital The 
incentive proved very errective. especially in the auto industry. as it was 
especially adequate for rellocating manufact.uring operations. Later. in the 
·global reach· phase, empllasis was given to joint ventures and import-to-
eiport schemes (the BEFIEX program) and other mechanisms seen as aucial 
by M.NCs ror their plans d. worldwide ralionaliz.ation d. activities. Very 
dearly lbe new challenges posed in a world in which FOi is intensive in 
intangible assets are yet to be properly met. and in lbese conditions Bruit 
might loose some d. its weight as a host a>untty. 
\ Furih•rw>nt, iacR&Sin.glJ, one should upecl MHCs to find il 0 111>re advantageous to 
redvt"e lhe tost ud the commercial risks associalecl vi.l.h direct investmeo.l and to play a 
role as inwraediaries on the input side (techo.ological innoYl&lioo.) as ftU as oo. the 
out.put"side (Ol>Dll'ol over markets through marbtin.g agreements)". <ECD ( 19&8. p. 76). 
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